The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine by Anzivino, Ralph C.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 90
Issue 4 Summer 2007 Article 4
The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the
Economic Loss Doctrine
Ralph C. Anzivino
ralph.anzivino@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 921 (2007).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol90/iss4/4
THEFRAUDINTHEINDUCEMENT 
EXCEPTION TO THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
RALPH C. ANZIVINO• 
I. Introduction .................. .. ... .................... ............. .... ....... ..... ...... 922 
II. The Differences Between Contract and Tort Actions ......... 923 
Ill . The Economic Loss Doctrine ................................................. 924 
IV. The Genesis and Growth of the Economic Loss 
Doctrine in Wisconsin ............................. ... ..................... ..... ... 928 
v. Identifying Economic Losses .................................................. 931 
VI. The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the 
Economic Loss Doctrine ...................... ......... ............ ... ........... 931 
VII. Contract Principles and Fraud .......................................... .. .... 936 
A. The "As Is" Clause and Fraud ..... .... .... .... .. ..... ...... ......... ... 936 
B. The Parol Evidence Rule and Fraud ................................ 937 
C. Contract Disclaimers and Exculpatory Clauses .............. 939 
D. Contract Principles Summary ...... .... .. ............................... 941 
VIII. Tort Principles and Fraud ..... ............. .. ........ .... ...... ... .... .......... 942 
A. Promissory Fraud ................. .. ........... ................................ 942 
B. Fraud in the Factum/Execution ........................................ 943 
C. Fraudulently Inducing One Not to Enter into a 
Contract ................................................................. .......... ... 943 
D. Fraudulently Inducing One Not to Perform a 
Contract ..... .... .... .. .... .................................. .. .. ................. ... . 944 
E. Duress .................. .. .............. ..... ......... ...... ....... ..... ............... 945 
F. Conversion by Acting Beyond the Scope of the 
Contract ................................................. ................... .... ...... 947 
G. Punitive Damages ............................................. ... ....... ... .... 948 
H. The Duty of Honesty and Fair Dealing .......................... . 955 
I. Torts Principles Summary ............................................... .. 957 
IX. The Statutory and Regulatory Approach to Fraudulent 
Inducement ............................................................................ ... 959 
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank Mr. Peter 
Kowals, Esq., L'2007, for his invaluable research assistance in preparing this Article. In 
addition, I am very grateful to my colleague, Professor Michael Waxman, for his insightful 
comments on the various drafts of this Article. 
922 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [90:921 
A. Statutory Fraudulent Inducement .......... .. ........................ . 959 
B. Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act.. ................... 961 
C. The Department of Agriculture, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection Regulations .................................... 965 
D. Statutory and Regulatory Summary ................................. 968 
X. Conclusion ......................................... .. ..... .. .... ... ... ......... .. ... ..... . 969 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dividing line between contract and tort law has always been a 
difficult one to draw. The sale of a product generally involves two broad 
concerns. One concern is a private one that contracting parties can 
agree on the terms of a private sale within defined Li:rnits. The second 
concern is a public concern that the product sold not cause any injury or 
damage. The economic loss doctrine follows tl1is public/private line of 
demarcation. The doctrine draws the line between contract and tort 
based on the type of damages suffered when the product does not meet 
contract specifications. The economic loss doctrine concludes that if a 
defective product causes solely economic loss, the dispute is essentially a 
private matter between the contracting parties and their contract should 
control their dispute. The public interest is not sufficiently involved to 
merit tort involvement. On the other hand, if a defective product causes 
personal injury or other property damage, then the public interest is 
involved and a tort approach, free of contractual limitations, is most apt. 
The doctrine has merit. 
Difficulties arise, however, when one is fraudulently induced to 
enter into a contract for a product, and only economic loss is incurred. 
There is no personal injury or other property damage. How does the 
fraud impact where the line is drawn under the economic loss doctrine? 
Is the public interest sufficiently involved to invoke tort law, or is this 
still a private matter between private contracting parties that invokes 
only contract law? The states have taken a number of different 
positions on this issue. Most states have adopted the broad fraud in the 
inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine. The broad 
exception provides that the fraud is an intentional tort, and as such, the 
intentional misrepresentation is actionable as a tort, notwithstanding 
that the contract losses are solely economic. A small minority of states, 
including recently Wisconsin, has adopted the narrow fraud in the 
inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine. The narrow 
exception provides that if the fraudulent inducement relates to 
interwoven fraud, then the fraud is not actionable under tort law, only 
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contract law. The only fraud actionable under the narrow fraud in the 
inducement exception is fraud considered to be extraneous to the 
contract. The purpose of this Article is to examine the narrow fraud in 
the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine under 
Wisconsin case law, statutes, and public policy to determine if it is a 
sound principle. 
II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT ACTIONS 
Because the economic loss doctrine determines whether a matter 
proceeds in court as a tort or contract action, that decision is a 
significant one. There are many differences between a tort and contract 
action. First, privity is generally required in a contract action but not in 
tort. 1 Second, the statutes of limitations are different. 2 The contract 
statute of limitations is generally six years,3 and the statute of 
limitations for tort can be two4 or three years. 5 Third, there are 
different pleading requirements for a fraud case6 as compared to a 
contract case. 7 Fourth, the burdens of proof are different. The burden 
of proof in a contract case is by "preponderance of the evidence,'' 8 and 
for a fraud case, it is "clear and convincing evidence." 9 Fifth, tort 
damages are designed to return the aggrieved party to his or her pre-
event condition and also serve as a vehicle to deter similar conduct from 
the tortfeaso r and others .in the future. 1° Contract damages are typically 
expectancy damages to place the aggrieved party in the position he or 
sbe would have been in had the contract been performed. 11 Sixth, 
punitive damages are availabl f r intentional tortious concluct12 but 
L Northridge Co. v. W.R Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 932-33, 471 N.W.2d 179, 184 
(1991); Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, <J['J[ 69-70, 283 Wis. 2d 511, <j[IJ[ 69-70, 699 
N.W.2d 167, 'll'J[ 69-70. 
2. Northridge Co., 162 Wis. 2d at 932-33, 471 N.W.2d at 184; Grams, 2005 WI 112, 
n 69-70, 283 Wis. 2d s11, n 69-70, 699 N.W.2d 167, n 69-70. 
3. WIS. STAT. § 893.43 (2005-2006) (action on contract). 
4. Id. § 893.57 (intentional torts). 
5. Id. § 893.54 (injury to the person). 
6. I d. § 802.03(2) (pleading special matters-fraud, mistake, and condition of mind); All-
Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999). 
7. WIS. STAT. § 425.109(1)(h); All-Tech, 174 F.3d at 867. 
8. Carle v. Nelson, 145 Wis. 593, 598, 130 N.W. 467, 469 (1911). 
9. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, <J[ 52,262 Wis. 2d 32, <J[ 52, 662 N.W.2d 
652, <J[ 52; see also Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 184, 368 N.W.2d 676, 681 (1985). 
10. Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 547-48, 297 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1980). 
1L RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 cmt. a (1981). 
12. See Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, <J[ 38,279 Wis. 2d 52, 'l[38, 694 N.W.2d 296, <J[ 38. 
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rarely are available in a contract action. 13 Tort law offers a broader 
array of damages than contract law. 14 Any of the foregoing differences 
may be critical depending upon the specifics of each case. When the 
economic loss doctrine applies, however, the doctrine mandates that the 
action be brought in contract, not tort. A forced election of remedy 
occurs as a result of the economic loss doctrine being applied to a case. 
III. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
The boundary between contract and tort has fluctuated with societal 
development. 15 Contract and tort law generally serve different 
interests. 16 Tort duties are imposed by law, and contract duties are 
imposed by bargaining. 17 Tort duties are imposed to protect society. 18 
There is a strong public policy component in tort duties to deter harmful 
conduct. 19 For example, an intentional misrepresentation is a serious 
wrong and a serious violation of community mores, which normally 
invokes tort liability.20 As a general rule, the United States Supreme 
Court has noted that in cases of overlap between tort and contract 
liability, tort liability should not be supplanted without good reason. 21 
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States has accepted and 
endorsed some form of the economic loss doctrine. 22 Only a few states 
have rejected it. 23 
13. White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290- 91 , 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967); Sassara v. 
Braun, No. 95-3300, 1997 WL 164020, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1997). 
14. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, 'l!14, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 'l[14, 699 N.W.2d 167, 
'll14; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, '1[24, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'l[24, 688 
N.W.2d 462, 'll 24. 
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 318, 592 N.W.2d 
201, 206 (1999). 
16. Cease, 2004 WI 139, 'l!39, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'll 39, 688 N.W.2d 462, 'll 39; Daanen & 
Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395,404--05,573 N.W.2d 842, 846-77 (1998). 
17. Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 933, 471 N.W.2d 179, 185 
(1991). 
18. Daanen & Janssen, 216 Wis. 2d at 405,573 N.W.2d at 846. 
19. Cease, 2004 WI 139, 'l[41 , 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'l[41, 688 N.W.2d 462, 'll 41. 
20. See Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 'll 26, 274 Wis. 2d 63,1, 'll 26, 683 N.W.2d 46, 
'l!26. 
21. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875,882-83 (1997). 
22. ALABA J'vlA: Lloyd W od Coal . v. Clark E quip. o., 543 So. 2d 671 672- 74 
(A la. 1989 . ALA KA: Prall & Whitney Can. Inc. v. Sheehan 852 P.2d 117 ,ll77 (Aia.ka 
l99 ); St. Denis v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban D ev., 900 F . Supp. 1194, 1200 (D. Alaska 1.995). 
ARI ZONA : alt Ri ver Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. We tinghouse E1ec. 
Corp., 694 P2d 198 209 Ariz. 1984); ar tens v. ily of Ph enix, 75 P.3d 1081. L084 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003); Ap II roup. l nc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 479-SO 9th ir. 1995 . 
CALLFO RNIA: Robinson Hel icopter . v. Dana orp., 102 P.3d 268, 272- 74 ( al. 2004). 
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COLORADO: A.C. Excnvating v. Yacht Jub 11 H mcowners Ass'n, Ll4 P. d 62 865 
(C lo. 2005); Town f Alma v. Azco Constr., lnc. 10 P.Jd 1256, 1264 ( olo. 2000). 
CONNE :TI T: ONN. GEN. , TAT. § 52-572c(n) (2005); Flagg Energy D v. orp. v. en . 
Motors Corp .. 709 A.2d 1075, 1088 (Cmm. 1998) (tipplying principles of the economic loss 
doctrine in " products liability case). Bw see Paliwoda v. Matllew , No. CV020398249S, 2006 
onn. SL!per. LEXIS 308, , at *16 ( onn. Super. t. Ocl. 16, 2006) (noting lhe plit in 
authority in lower court with regru·d to meaning of Fl(lgg) . DELAWARE: Dan{ rth v. 
Acorn tructurcs lnc., A.2d 1194, 1198 (D l. 1992). FLORIDA: lndem. Tns. o. of . 
Am. v. Am. Aviation, fnc. , 891 o. 2d 532, 536 ( Ia. 2004). EORGlA: Gen. Elec. o. v. 
Lowe's Home lrs. , Inc. 608 . .2d 636, 638 ( a. 2005). HA WAIT: Ci ty Express, Tnc. v. 
xprc.~s Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 839 (Haw. 1998); State v. U .. Steel orp. , 919 P.2d 294, 302 
(Haw. 1996). IDAHO: Blabd v. Richard B. mith , Inc .. 108 P.3d 99 , 1000 (Idaho 2005). 
lLLrN I :First Midwest Bank, .A. v. SlewarL Title uar. o., 843 N.E.2d 327, 333-. 4 (TU. 
2006); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat I T<1nk Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (ILl. l982) . INDIANA: 
unkel v. RcnovaUons Inc .. 822 .E .2d 150,152 (lnd. 2005). I WA:Ueterman v. Johnson, 
613 N.W.2d 259 261-62 (Iowa 2000). KAN A : Prendiville v. ontcmporary Homes, Inc., 83 
P.3d 1257, 1260 Kan. t. App. 2004); Full Faith hurch or Love W. Tnc. v. Ho ver . rea ted 
Wood Prods., lnc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (D. Kan. 2002) (predicting the KnJ1sas upr me 
urL would agree with the Kansa ourt of Appeals and endorse the economic Joss 
doctrine). KENTUCKY: Presn·en on tr. Managers, lnc. v. EH on tr., LLC, 134 .W.3d 
575, 583 (Ky. 2004) (Keller, J. , concurring) (slating that the court should explicitly ad plthc 
economic I s d ctrine); Ml. Lebanon Pcrs. are Home. Lnc. v. Hoover 1liver al , Inc., 276 
F.Jd 845. 849 (6lh ir. 2002 (predicting the Kentucky Supreme ourt would apply the 
economic I ss doctrine to a business purchase). MAINE: Oceanside at Pin Point Condo. 
Owner As. 'n v . . Peachtree Do rs, lnc., 659 A.2d 267, 270 (Me. l995). MARYLAND: Morris 
v. Osm sc Wo d Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 63.[ (Md. 1995). MA SACH SETTS: Berish v. 
Bornstein, 770 N.E.2d 961, 975 (Mass. 2002). M.lCHlGAN: Ncibarger v. Universal Coops., 
Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992). MINNESOTA: MINN. TAT. § 04.10 (2006). 
MIS IS JPPI: Progre sive Ins. Co. v. Monaco oach COrJ?., No. 1:05cv37-DMR- JMR, 200 
.. Dist. LEXlS 21251 at ''5 (S.D. Mi ·s. Mar. 29, 2006); E. Miss. lee. Power Ass'n v. 
Porcelain Prods. ,o. , 729 F. upp. 5U, 514 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (predicting that the Mississippi 
upreme ourt would not allow recovery of olely economic losses temming from a 
de(cctive product in tort); Stale Farm Mut. A uto. Ins. o. v. Ford Motor Co .. 736 So. 2d 384, 
387 (Mi . t. AJ p. 1999). MlSSOURJ: Sharp Bros. ntracting o. v. Am. Hoisl & Derrick 
o., 70 .W.2d 901 903 (Mo. 1986); SeU v. Equllon Enters., LLC. No. 4:00 Vl903 T.IA 
2005 U.S. Disl. LEXIS 17288, at *40 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2005). NEBRASKA: Nat' l Crane 
~orp. v. hlo ' tecl Tube o. 332 N.W.2d 39,43 (Ncb. 1983). NEVADA: Calloway v. ' ty of 
Reno 993 !J.2d 1259, 1266 (Nev. 2000) rev 'd on orher grounds. Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31, 
33 (2004). NEW HAMPSHIRE: Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 891 A.2d 477 495 
(N.H. 2005 . NEW J R EY: Alloway v. Gen. Marine lndll!i. , L.P., 695 A.2d 264. 275 ( . .J . 
1997). NEW MEXICO: 111 re onsol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig. 893 P.2d 438,445-46 
(N.M. 1995). N .. w Y RK: Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors rp. , 645 N.E.2d J 195 
1196, 11 9 ( .Y. 1995). N RT I-1: CAR UNA: Moore v. COachmen Indus. lnc., 499 S. .2d 
772.780 (N. . l. App. 1998). NORTH DAKOTA: Leiner v. Ford Motor ., 606 N.W.2d 
881, 885 (N.D. 2000). OHIO: orp rex Dev. & Constr. Mgmt. , Inc. v. hook. lnc., 835 
N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ohio 2005). OKLAHOMA: Dutsch v. Sea Ray B<lals. Inc .. 845 P.2d I 7, 
.19 (Ok la. 1992); Waggoner v. Town & ountry Mobile Homes, lnc., 808 .P.2d 49, 653 
(Okh1. I 90); Ullited G If, LL v. Westlake hem. rp. , No. 05- CV- 0495- VE- PJ , 2006 
lJ .. D.i t. LEX! 57531, at *7 ( .D. Okla. Aug. l5, 2006). OREGON: Harris v, Suniga, 149 
P. d 224, 227 r. 2006): r. Steel Mill · Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP. 83 P.3d 322, 328 
( r. 2004); On ita Pac. Corp. v. Tr. f Bronson 843 P 2d 890, 896- 97 (Or. 1992)· Hale v. 
roce. 744 P.2d U89, 1290 (O r. 1987). PENNSYLV ANJA: Bill- Rite on tractor . v. 
926 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [90:921 
The economic loss doctrine developed largely in response to the 
extension of product liability law into contract law. Product liability law 
protects buyers of products from personal injury and damage to other 
property. 24 Product liability law does not cover cases where the loss is 
solely economic. The theory behind the economic loss doctrine is that 
once a bargain is struck and contract terms are agreed upon, the buyer 
should not be able to circumvent the contract terms via tort. 25 However, 
there needs to be a balance struck between honoring the parties' 
contract and protecting the public from dangerous products. 26 Clearly, 
when one suffers personal injury or other property damage from a 
defective product, the balance is in favor of tort. On the other hand, 
when solely economic loss is involved, the balance is in favor of the 
contract to control the parties' dispute. 
The policy arguments for imposing tort duties are diminished where 
only economic loss is involved. 27 "Whether a product meets a certain 
level of performance or a purchaser's expectations is not a matter of 
Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286-87 (Pa. 2005). RHODE ISLAND: Rousseau v. K.N. 
Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999) (holding economic loss rule is inapplicable to 
consumer transactions); Bo. l n Jnv. Prop. #1 tate v. E.W.. Burman, Inc. , 658 A.2d 515, 518 
(R.I. 1995). SOUTH CAROUNA: Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon, 
Jones & Goulding, Inc. 463 .. 2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995). SOUTH OAK TA: Diamond Surface 
Inc. v. SLHie emem Plant Comm 'n, 583 N.W.2d 155, 161 (S.D. 1998). TENNESSE ~: Messer 
ricsbeim indus. lnc. v. Eastman hem. ., 194 S.W.3d 466,471- 72 (T nn. l. ApJ>. 2005); 
Tri nity lndus. fnc. v. McKinnon Bri.d e o., 77 .W.3d 159, 173 ('I'enn. Ct. App. 2001). 
TEXAS: Formosa Pia tics orp. SA v. Presicli Eng rs & ontractors, 960 S.W.2d 41 45 
(Tex. 1998). UTAH: Hermansen v. Tasuli . 48 P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002). VERMONT : 
Hamill v. Pawtuck ! Mul. lns. ., 92 A.2d 226, 229 Vt. 2005). VIR INlA: Filak v. 
George, 594 S.E.2d 10 613 (Va. 2004). WASlliNGT N: Alejandre v. Bull, 9 P.3d 844,852 
(Wash . t. App. 2004); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle , ch. Oist. No. I, 881 P.2d 
~ 86, 990 (Wa h. L994); Reynolds Metals o, v. A lcan Inc., No. 04-017SRJB, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 29033, at *8-*9 (W.O. Wash. Apr. 28, 2006). WEST VIRGINIA: Aikens v. Debow, 
541 S.E .2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000). WISCONSIN: 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, 
Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 'l! 5, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 'lJ 5, 716 N.W.2d 822, 'lJ 5. WYOMING: D & D 
Transp., Ltd. v. Interline Energy Servs., Inc., 117 P.3d 423, 427 (Wyo. 2005). 
23. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has chosen not to adopt the economic loss doctrine. 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Case Corp., 878 S.W.2d 741, 743 {Ark. 1994); Blagg v. Fred Hunt 
Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981). Montana has likewise declined to follow the economic 
loss doctrine. Jim's Excavating Serv., Inc. v. HKM Assocs., 878 P.2d 248, 252, 255 (Mont. 
1994). 
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCfS LIABILITY§ 21 (1998). 
25. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 329-30, 592 
N.W.2d 201, 211 (1999). 
26. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (W.O. Wis. 1997). 
27. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 573 N.W.2d 842, 
847 (1998). 
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societal interest." 28 Rather it is the domain of contract law. 29 Thus, as a 
general rule, in the absence of any tort concern, contract law is better 
suited to govern the parties' dispute. Societal interests direct that the 
nature of the damages incurred is apparently the tipping point for the 
economic loss doctrine. A dangerous or defective product that causes 
no personal injury or other property damage is not actionable under tort 
law, only contract law. 30 Since only economic losses have been incurred, 
the parties' contract understandably should govern their dispute. 
Interject negligence into the transaction, and the economic loss doctrine 
still provides that the parties' contract shall control their dispute over 
the economic losses. 31 The negligence does not arouse sufficient public 
policy concerns to permit the aggrieved party to assert the tort to 
recover solely economic losses. In other words, there is not a sufficient 
basis to circumvent the contract with a tort claim. 
The decision to prefer the contract over negligence is consistent with 
established contract and tort principles. Under contract law, parties are 
permitted by contract to exculpate themselves from liability for 
1. 32 neg rgence. 
Public policy does not disfavor such bargaining. In fact, the 
economic loss doctrine expects parties to bargain with reference to all 
foreseeable matters within their contractual relationship. 33 Thus, when 
the economic loss doctrine mandates that the contract shall govern the 
recovery of solely economic losses despite negligence, no established 
public policy is disturbed. In fact, the economic loss doctrine is 
consistent with established public policy and precedent. On the other 
hand, public policy favors tort responsibility when a product causes 
personal injury or other property damage, notwithstanding contractual 
terms to the contrary. 34 
28. State Farm, 225 Wis. 2d at 321,592 N.W.2d at 207. 
29. !d. 
30. RESTATEMENT (THTRD) Or TORTS: PRODU ·s L IABl UTY § 21 (1998). 
3 1. But see lns. . of N. Am. v. ease Elec. Inc., 2004 Wl 139, !]! 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 
<[52. 688 .W.2d 462 'II 52 (holding that the economic loss doctrine doe: not app ly to 
contracts for . ervices). See also John D. Fi nerty, Jr . & harles J. rucger, A ommentary 011 
the Economi · Loss Doctrine U11der the RIJ/e of ease Electric and ascade lone, 89 MA RQ . 
. R EV. 137 (2005 (cri ticizing tbe decision to exempt service c nlracts from application of 
tbe economic loss doctrine). 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 195 cmt. a (1981). 
33. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, <j[ 48, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 
<j[ 48,699 N.W.2d 205, 'J[48. 
34. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1962); WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3) (2005-2006); Wausau Tile, Inc. v. 
County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 248,593 N.W.2d 445, 452 (1999). 
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IV. THE GENESIS AND GROWTH OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
IN WISCONSIN 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first recognized the economic loss 
doctrine in 1989.35 In Sunnyslope Grading, Inc., two commercial parties 
entered into a contract for the sale of a machine. 36 The contract 
contained warranties and limitation of remedies as provided by the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Subsequently, the machine 
developed problems, and the buyer sought consequential damages. The 
contract, however, expressly precluded the recovery of consequential 
damages. 37 As a result, the buyer sued in tort to avoid the contractual 
limitations. The Supreme Court concluded that "a commercial 
purchaser of a product cannot recover solely economic losses" in tort 
where the parties have negotiated a contract that defines the buyer's 
remedies. 38 
A number of rationales are used to support the decision that 
prevents a tort action from circumventing the contract. One, of course, 
is to honor the contract. Theoretically, each party has negotiated the 
best terms available through their mutual promises, and absent some 
superseding reason, each should receive the benefit of their bargain. 
Another rationale is that the U.C.C. is a carefully constructed legislative 
framework that governs transactions in machines (goods), and tort law 
should not be used to undermine the U.C.C.'s application. The reasons 
often stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court are: (1) to "maintain[] the 
fundamental distinction between tort law and contract law"; (2) to 
protect commercial parties' freedom to allocate economic risk by 
contract; and (3) to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk 
of economic loss, the commercial buyer, to "assume, allocate, or insure 
against" that risk. 39 Unquestionably, these are strong rationales that 
supported the Wisconsin Supreme Court's adoption of the economic 
loss doctrine. 40 
35. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 916, 
437 N.W.2d 213,215 (1989). 
36. Id. at 912-13,437 N.W.2d at 214. 
37. /d. at 914, 437 N.W.2d at 214. 
38. Id. at 921,437 N.W.2d at 217-18. 
39. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111 , H 46, 48, 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 
9l'll 46, 48, 50, 699 N.W.2d 205, H 46, 48, 50 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, 
Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 410, 573 N.W.2d 842, 849 (1997)). 
40. The United States Supreme Court also adopted the economic loss doctrine in East 
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874-75 (1986). 
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The economic loss doctrine has landed in fertile ground in 
Wisconsin. The doctrine's humble origin was a dispute over a defective 
"product" between "commercial parties" that resulted in a tort barrier 
in a U.C.C. case. 41 Notably, the doctrine has three components that 
could have been used to curtail its growth. First, the doctrine wa 
limited to a "product" 42 or more specifically a 'good.' 43 Second the 
transaction was between commercial parties. And third, the doctrine 
wa applied to a U.C.C. ca e where Article 244 has detailed and explicit 
rules that g vern the parties transaction. In all three areas the 
doctrin s scope has been expanded. 
he d fini tion of a product has been expanded from a good to also 
include real property, including a new home45 and a forty-two unit 
condominium complex. 46 The doctrine's coverage has increased from 
applying to commercial transactions to also include consumer 
transactions. 47 Finally, the doctrine has been expanded beyond U.C.C. 
disputes to any contract dispute involving a product.48 
The growth of the economic loss doctrine has not been limited to 
simply expanding its three components. The scope of the economic loss 
doctrine has also been expanded by limiting the traditional areas of tort 
coverage. A em Uary of the economic loss doctrine is that if a defective 
product cau es per nal injury or other property damage, then tort 
theories are available t the aggrieved party. How ver, two exceptions 
to the 'other property" provi j n have further limited tort availability 
and thereby expanded the scope of the economic loss doctrine. 
The first exception is the "integrated systems" exception. The 
integrated systems exception provides that damage by a defective 
product that is a component of an integrated system, to either the 
41. Sunnyslope, 148 Wis. 2d at 916, 437 N.W.2d at 215. 
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 19 (1998) . 
43. U.C.C. § 2-105 (1962) ; WIS. STAT.§ 402.105(b)- (c) (2005-2006). 
44. WIS. STAT. §§ 402.101-725 (2005- 2006). 
45. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co. , 2005 WI 113, 'l[25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 'll 25, 699 N.W.2d 
189, 'l[25. 
46. 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 'l[67, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 'll 67, 
716 N.W.2d 822, 'll 67. 
47. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 324, 592 N.W.2d 
201, 209 (1999). 
48. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co. , 2005 WI 111, 'l!27, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'll 27, 
699 N.W.2d 205, '1{27; Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 'll'l!19-20, 274 Wis. 2d 631 , 'll'l!19-
20, 683 N.W.2d 46, 'll'l!19-20; Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 
1233 (W.D . Wis. 1997). 
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system or other system components, is not damage to other property. 49 
Thus, tort theories are not available to the aggrieved party. 
The second exception is the "disappointed performance 
expectations" exception. This exception provides that other property 
has also not been damaged when the "prevention of the subject risk was 
one of the contractual expectations motivating the purchase of the 
defective product." 50 In other words, if a defective product causes other 
property damage, but the damage could have been within the scope of 
the bargaining, it does not qualify as other property damage. The net 
effect of both exceptions to the other property provision is to expand 
the coverage of the economic loss doctrine and to curtail the application 
of tort principles. In a final expansion, the economic loss doctrine has 
been applied to circumstances where there was no contract between the 
parties51 and solely economic losses were incurred. 
There have been some limits, however, placed on the economic loss 
doctrine. The most significant limitation is that it does not apply to 
contracts where the primary purpose is to provide services. 52 The courts 
use the "predominant" test to determine whether the contract 
predominantly involves providing a service or the sale of a product. 53 
Another limitation is the "public safety" exception. The public safety 
exception provides that where a product has an intrinsic health hazard, 
tort theories are available to the aggrieved party even though only 
economic losses have been incurred. 54 The public safety exception, 
however, has not been used other than for one case of installing asbestos 
in a shopping center. 55 Other than the two limitations noted above, the 
economic loss doctrine has been greatly expanded by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court. Wisconsin now has one of the broadest coverages in 
the United States. 
49. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 245, 593 N.W.2d 445 , 
452 (1999) . 
50. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, !J[ 43, 283 Wis. 2d 511, !J[ 43, 699 N.W.2d 167, 
!J[ 43 (quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 975 (E .D. Wis. 1999)). 
51. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, <j[ 17, 283 Wis. 2d 606, <j[ 17,699 N.W.2d 
189,<j[17. 
52. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, !J[ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 9[ 52, 688 
N.W.2d 462, 9[52. But see Finerty & Crueger, supra note 31 (criticizing the Cease decision). 
53. Linden, 2005 WI 113, 9! 8, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 9! 8, 699 N.W.2d 189, <j[ 8. 
54. Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 937-38,471 N.W.2d 179, 186 
(1991). 
55. See Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 922, 937-38, 471 N.W.2d at 180, 186; see also Wausau 
Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 264-65, 593 N.W.2d 445, 458-59 (1999) 
(rejecting the public safety exception) . 
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V. IDENTIFYING ECONOMIC LOSSES 
The tipping point between contract and tort under the economic loss 
doctrine is the type of damages suffered. If a defective product causes 
solely economic loss then contract law controls. On the other hand, if a 
defective product causes personal injury or other property damage, then 
tort law controls. Thus, it is critical to be able to identify solely 
economic losses. Economic losses are those damages that arise 
whenever the product does not perform as agreed, "including damage to 
the product itself or monetary losses caused by the product."56 
Economic losses include the difference in value between what is 
received and the value as represented; 57 the cost of repair or 
replacement; 58 lost profits;59 the costs of paying third party claims as a 
result of the defective product;60 and any other losses that are not 
personal injury or other property damage.61 
VI. THE FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC 
LOSS DOCTRINE 
Fraud in the inducement is "when a misrepresentation leads another 
to enter into a transaction with a false impression of the risks, duties, or 
obligati ns involved." 62 In general, courts have taken three approaches 
wh n fraud i used to induce one to enter into a contract and solely 
ec nomic los es are incurred. 63 The first approach is to ignore the fraud 
and the defra uded party's remedy is solely contract, not tort. 64 The 
second approach is a broad exception that recognizes the fraud as a tort 
in all cases of fraudulent inducement. 65 The defrauded party is free to 
56. Linden, 2005 WI 113, '![ 6, 283 Wis. 2d 606, '![ 6, 699 N.W.2d 189, '![ 6. 
57. Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 926, 471 N.W.2d at 182. 
58. !d., 471 N.W.2d at 182; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 
2d 305, 343, 592 N.W.2d 201 , 216 (1999); Wausau Tile, Inc. , 226 Wis. 2d at 248, 593 N.W.2d at 
452. 
59. Wausau Tile, Inc., 226 Wis. 2d at 257, 593 N.W.2d at 455; Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 
926, 471 N.W.2d at 182; 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 94, '![ 24, 293 
Wis. 2d 410, '![ 24, 716 N.W.2d 822, '![ 24. 
60. Wausau Tile, Inc., 226 Wis. 2d at 253,593 N.W.2d at 454. 
61. 1325 N. Van Buren, 2006 WI 94, '![ 24, 293 Wis. 2d 410, '![ 24, 716 N.W.2d 822, '![ 24; 
State Farm , 22.5 Wis. 2d at 320, 592 N.W.2d at 207. 
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004) . 
63. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, '![ 31, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 31 , 
699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 31. 
64. !d. '![ 31 , 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 31, 699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 31. 
65. !d., 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 31, 699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 31. 
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seek a remedy in tort. Seven states have adopted the broad exception, 66 
and federal courts have indicated that thirteen other states will likely 
adopt it. 67 The rationale of the broad approach is that the deceitful 
66. ALABAMA: Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, 726 So. 2d 626, 631 (Ala. 1998) (stating that 
the court has often allowed fraudulent inducement claims for economic loss from 
misrepresented value of a product, even when the product was working properly). 
CALIFORNIA: Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 274 (Cal. 2004) (citing 
Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 983 (Cal. 1999)) (stating that tort damages have been 
allowed in contract cases for fraudulent inducement). COLORADO: Town of Alma v. Azco 
Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263-64 (Colo. 2000) (stating that the economic loss rule does not 
apply to claims arising from a duty independent of contract and that common law fraud is an 
independent duty); United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227 
(lOth Cir. 2000) (finding that Colorado's economic loss rule only applies to some forms of 
negligence . HA WAll: ta te v. U.S. Steel orp., 919 P.2d 294, 02 (Haw. 1996) (stating that 
111 economic los$ d ctrin d es not apply t claims of negligent misrepresentation or fraud). 
ILLINOIS: Moorman Mfg. o. v. Nat' I Tank o., 4 5 N. - .2d 443, 452 (UJ. 1982) (stating that 
economic loss is recoverable when false representations are made); Faust Printing, Inc. v. 
MAN Capital Corp., No. 02- -9345, 2006 U.S. Di ' l. LEXlS 44140, at *20 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 
2006) (finding the fraudulen t misrepresentation exception from Moorman is still viable). 
NEBRASKA: Streeks, Inc. v. Diamond Hill Farms, Lnc., 605 N.W.2d 110, 123 (Neb. 2000) 
(stating that a purchaser is not limited to con tract and may bring an action for fraudulent 
misrepresentation as well). TEXAS: Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & 
Contractors, 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (holding that damages can be recovered for 
fraudulent inducement even when misrepresentations concern the subject matter of the 
contract). 
67 . IOWA: Cunningham v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 872, 887 (N.D. Iowa 1999) 
(predicting that Iowa would adopt a broad fraud exception and not follow Florida's narrow 
exception). MASSACHUSETTS: Arthur D. Little Int'l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp. 
1189, 1192 (D. Mass. 1996) (stating that "[t]he economic loss rule does not apply to 
intentional misrepresentations"). MARYLAND: Superior Bank, F.S.B. v. Tandem Nat'! 
Mortgage, Inc., No. MJG-99-2360, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22224, at *8 (D. Md. May 12, 2000) 
(stating that when "misrepresentations induce [a party] to enter into a contract, the economic 
loss rule does not apply") . MINNESOTA: Lester Bldg. Sys. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., No. 
A03-48, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 156, at *16-*18 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004) (finding that 
federal cases interpreting Minnesota law did not consider the recent amendment to the 
ec n mic lo s sta tute and lhat the fraud ex·emptiort does n t mention anylhing abollt needing 
to be extraneous of the contract). EBRASKA: Accurate mmc'ns, LL v. Starlcl Corp .• 
. 4:05CV3286, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXT. 11 232, at ~·9-10 (D. Neb. f1' b. 2 , 2006) (finding tha t 
ebraska Jaw will allow a plai ntiff lo bring a breach of contract and misrcpresentut.i.on action 
simultaneously). N V ADA: Yerington Ford, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance orp., 359 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075, l083-84 (D. ev. 2004) (noting that tort claims will be barred when not 
independent of c ntractual duties, but fraud in the inducement is always extraneous of the 
c nl'ract). NEW JER E Y: Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co., 226 F. 
Supp. 2d 557, 56 (D.N.J. 2002) (finding that in New Jersey, fraud must be extraneous to the 
contract in order to survive the economic loss rule, and noting that fraud in the inducement is 
generally extraneous to the contract) . NEW YORK: EED Holdings v. Palmer Johnson 
Acquisition Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 265, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding it well established in 
New York law that fraudulent inducement is collateral to the contract and will support a 
fraud claim). OHIO: Onyx Envtl. Servs., LLC v. Maison, 407 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879 (N.D. Ohio 
2005) (finding that fraud in the inducement implicates a duty distinct from contractual duties, 
and thus the economic loss doctrine does not apply). SOUTH CAROLINA: Enhance-It, 
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conduct arouses a sufficient public interest to permit tort principles to 
apply to remedy the wrong. The third approach is a narrow exception 
that recognizes the fraud as a tort only where the fraud is not 
interwoven with the quality or character of the goods or otherwise 
involves performance of the contract. In other words, the fraud is 
actionable as a tort only if it is extraneous to the subject matter of the 
contract. Wisconsin, Florida, and arguably Michigan68 are the only 
states to adopt the narrow exception. 69 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
offered three rationales for adopting the narrow approach. 7° First, the 
narrow exception maintains the fundamental distinction between 
contract and tort law. 71 Matters that are expressly or implicitly dealt 
with in the contract, such as the performance or quality or character of 
the goods sold, still must be addressed by the contract. Second, the 
narrow exception promotes and protects the parties' freedom to 
contract. 72 The parties are expected to negotiate with reference to all 
those matters that one would expect should be addressed in the 
contract. Third, the narrow exception encourages the party with the 
best understanding of the attendant risks, the buyer, to assume, allocate, 
L.L.C. v. Am. Access Techs., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 626, 634 (D.S.C. 2006) (finding that a party 
induced into entering a contract has the election of either tort or contract remedies). 
SOUTH DAKOTA: N.W. Pub. Serv. v. Union Carbide Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 
(D.S.D. 2000) (predicting the South Dakota Supreme Court would adopt a broad fraud 
exception). UTAH: Associated Diving & Marine Contractors v. Granite Constr. Co., No. 
2:01CV330DB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21560, at *23 (D. Utah July 10, 2003) (finding a claim 
for fraud in the inducement cannot be barred by the economic loss doctrine). VIRGINIA: 
McKesson Medical-Surgical, Inc. v. A.T. Kearney, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (finding that fraud that precedes contract formation does not implicate a contractual 
duty and that the economic loss rule will not apply); City of Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. 
Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that fraud implicates a tort duty and 
that the economic loss rule only bars those claims arising from contractual duties). 
68. The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet decided amongst the three approaches. 
69. FLORIDA: HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 
(Fla. 1996) (finding tort claims must be independent of the contractual obligations or they are 
barred by the economic loss rule); Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 542-
43 (Fla. 2004). MICHIGAN: Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 
532 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding tort claims must be extraneous from 
contract matter); GE Healthcare Fin. Servs. v. Cardiology & Vascular Assocs., No. 05-71304, 
2006 WL 950268, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2006) (holding that plaintiff must show a 
misrepresentation is "extraneous to the contract"). WISCONSIN: Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. 
Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, <J[ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[ 42, 699 N.W.2d 205, <J[ 42 (finding 
fraud in the inducement will be barred by the economic loss doctrine unless extraneous to the 
contract). 
70. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, <J[<J[ 46, 48, 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[<J[ 46, 48, 50, 699 N.W.2d 205, 
n 46, 48, 5o. 
71. !d. <J[ 46, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[ 46, 699 N.W.2d 205, <Jl 46. 
72. !d. <J[ 48, 283 Wis. 2d 555, <J[ 48, 699 N.W.2d 205, <J[ 48. 
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or insure against the risk of fraud on interwoven terms. 73 Federal courts 
have indicated that five other states will likely adopt the narrow 
exception.74 Some states have not given any indication whether a fraud 
in the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine will be 
. d 75 recogmze . 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception requires the 
aggrieved party to establish: (1) that all the elements of intentional 
misrepresentation are present;76 (2) that the intentional 
misrepresentation occurred prior to contract formation; and (3) that the 
fraud relates to a matter extraneous to the contract. 77 The narrow 
exception requires the court to draw a distinction between those matters 
that are interwoven with the contract and those that are extraneous. 
Only the concept of interwoven is defined. 
73. Id. 'll 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'l! 50, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'll 50. 
74. ARIZONA: QC Constr. Prods., LLC v. Cohill's Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 
2d 1008, 1015-16 (D. Ariz. 2006) (finding that fraud claims are barred by the economic loss 
doctrine as not distinct from breach of contract). DELAWARE: Pinkert v. John J. Olivieri, 
P.A., No. 99-380-SCR, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8133, at *18 (D. Del. May 24, 2001) (finding 
that fraud claims will be barred by economic loss doctrine if not contingent on duties outside 
of contract); In re Crown-Simplimatic Inc., 299 B.R. 319, 324 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (holding 
that fraud in the inducement claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine as the violated 
rights were encompassed in contract). KENTUCKY: Strathmore Web Graphics v. Sanden 
Mach., Ltd., No. 3:99CV-345-S, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22618, at *9-10 (W.D. Ky. May 16, 
2000) (holding that fraud in the inducement claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine 
as the fraud was not distinct from breach of contract or warranty claims). But cf. Davis v. 
Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (refusing to bar 
a fraud in the inducement claim stemming from an employment contract without guidance 
from Kentucky courts). MISSOURI: Self v. Equilon Enters., LLC, No. 4:00CV1903 TIA, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17288, at *40 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2005) (predicting that the Missouri 
Supreme Court would hold that the economic loss rule would bar all fraud claims that were 
not independent of the contract). PENNSYLVANIA: Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 
F.3d 661, 680 (3d Cir. 2002) (predicting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would find 
that the economic loss doctrine would bar intentional torts, but that fraud in the inducement 
will be an exception if extraneous to the subject matter of the contract); Lake St. Gaming, 
LLC v. !Games Entm't, Inc., No. 04-4965, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38141, at *8, *10 (E. D. Pa. 
June 8, 2006) (requiring fraud in the inducement claim to be based on facts not embodied in 
contract); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (following Werwinski, stating that even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
applied the economic loss doctrine to bar fraud claims, fraud in the inducement would be 
allowed if extraneous to subject matter of the contract). 
75. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
76. Wis. JI-Civil2401 (2005) (misrepresentation: intentional deceit). 
77. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, 'l[42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'l!42, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'l[42. 
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Interwoven contract terms arise in two different ways. The fir t i 
terms that relate to the quality or character of the product that is the 
subject matter of the contract. 78 Those term that relate to the quality or 
character of the product are further defined a either: (1) expressly dealt 
with in the contract or (2) relating to the "reasonable expectations of 
the parties to the risk of loss in the event the goods purchased did not 
meet tl1e purchaser's expectations. '79 The second way interwoven 
contract terms arise is in matters that involve performance under the 
contract.Sil No definition is provided to identify tho e matters that 
involve performance under the contract. More importantly the decision 
to distinguish interwoven terms and extraneous terms is a murky one. 
Even for those few states that have adopted the narrow exception, the 
guidance is uneven. 
In Wisconsin, the supreme court adopted the narrow fraud in the 
inducement exception in Kaloti v. Kellogg Enterprises Inc. 81 In Kaloti, a 
food wholesaler brought an action against a cereal company and its 
representative for damages it incurred as a re ult of Kellogg's failure to 
disclose a change in the: company's marketing strategy.82 The contract 
was for the sale of food products that Kaloti intended to resell to 
retailers. At the time of the contract Kellogg had also decided to sell 
directly to the same retailers, but it did not disclose that fact to Kaloti. 
The court concluded tlllat Kellogg's failure to disclose the change in 
marketing strategy was an intentional misrepresentation.83 Further, the 
court concluded that the intentional misrepresentation was extraneous 
to, not interwoven with, the contract. The court reasoned that the 
misrepresentation did not regard the quality or character of the product 
sold or performance under the contract. "Rather, the alleged 
misrepresentation concerned a matter whose risk was never 
contemplated to be a part of the contract to purchase Kellogg's 
products." 84 
It is difficult to see how Kellogg's decision to sell directly to Kaloti's 
customers is not a matter involving performance under the contract or 
otherwise interwoven in the sale of the product. Obviously, this is a 
difficult decision to make. Little guidance is provided from the other 
78. /d. ~ 43 283 Wi . 2d 555, Cj{ 43, 699 N.W.2d 205, ~ 43. 
79. ld. , 283 Wis. 2d 555, '1 43, 699 N.W.2d 205, '[ 43. 
80. /d. <Ji 42,283 Wis. 2d 555, 1 42, 699 N.W.2cl205, ~ 42. 
81. ld., 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205. 
82. !d. '1. 6, 283 Wis. 2d 555, Cf 6, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'I! 6. 
83. ld. 1( 52> 283 Wis. 2d 555, f{ 52, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'll 52. 
84. /d. <]!45, 283 Wis. 2d 555,1 45, 699 N.W.2d 205, 'l[ 45. 
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states that have adopted the narrow exception. In Michigan, no cases 
have been decided to illustrate those terms that are extraneous to the 
subject matter. In Florida, the cases decided after the Florida Supreme 
Court adopted the narrow exception85 are perplexing. In Allen v. 
Stephan Co., the seller of a business made representations that the 
business "had paid its taxes, filed all necessary tax returns and that the 
company's financial statements accurately disclosed all of its 
liabilities." 86 The representations were incorporated into the sales 
agreement. The Florida Court of Appeals held that the fraud claim was 
not barred by the economic loss doctrine even though the fraudulent 
inducement related to matters included in the contract. 87 Similarly, in 
La Pesca Grande Charters v. Moran, the seller of a yacht made 
representations that its engines were recently rebuilt, that the hull was 
sound, and that the fire extinguisher system was operational. 88 The 
representations were false, and the buyer sued for fraud. The trial court 
dismissed the fraud claim. 89 The Florida District Court of Appeals, 
however, reversed. The buyer was permitted to pursue its fraud claim 
though the representations unquestionably were interwoven terms. 90 
Clearly, the narrow exception has only been marginally adopted and is 
difficult to apply. 
VII. CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND FRAUD 
A. The "As Is" Clause and Fraud 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception clearly contradicts 
the well-established principle that fraudulent conduct is punished as a 
tort despite a clause in the party's contract that may provide otherwise. 
An "as is" clause is a common clause used in the sale of a property. 
Essentially "[a]n 'as is' clause puts the burden on the buyer ... to 
determine the condition of the property being purchased. "91 This is 
essentially the same as the third rationale used by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in adopting the narrow exception, which is to encourage 
85. HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996). 
86. 784 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
87. !d. at 458. 
88. 704 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
89. !d. 
90. !d. 
91. McCabe v. Midwest Evergreens, Inc. No. 95-2148, 1996 WL 118456, at *1 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 19, 1996); see Fulton v. Vogt, No. 96-1972, 1998 WL 313409, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 16, 1998). 
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the party with the best understanding of the attendant risks, the buyer, 
to assume, allocate, and insure against the risk. 92 An as is clause is a 
complete disclaimer of any implied warranties. 93 Further, the seller has 
no duty to investigate where the contract contains an as is clause. 94 If 
property i sold as is and there i no fraud in the process, the clause is 
effective.95 On the other hand, once fraud is introduced into the 
process, the contract clause is no longer effective. The as is clause does 
not protect one from a lawsuit based on one's intentional 
misrepresentation. 96 The courts have clearly indicated that one's fraud 
supersedes the negotiated contract terms. Public policy dictate that a 
deceitful person cannot hide behind an as i clause in a contract. The 
fraud is actionable under tort law despite the contract clause negotiated 
between the parties. 97 The rationale underlying the courts' decisions i 
clear. The seller, not the buyer, is the party best able to understand the 
attendant risks in the transaction. The seller is introducing fraud into 
the transaction. Focusing tort liabilities on the seller is the most 
effective way to insure against deceitful conduct by sellers in the future. 
Requiring the buyer to protect himself against the seller's fraud is 
pressure applied at the wrong point. The courts have recognized this 
principle when as is clauses and fraud have conflicted in the past. The 
courts have not required a buyer to protect himself in a contract against 
a seller's deceitful conduct as the Kellogg decision requires. 
B. The Parol Evidence Rule and Fraud 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss 
doctrine completely undercuts the policy and rationale for creating the 
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule 
provides that prior or contemporaneous evidence is not admissible to 
vary or contradict the terms of a written contract that is final and 
complete. 98 The rule is also stated that a "completely integrated 
92. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, <J[ 50, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 
<J[ 50, 699 N.W.2d 205, <J[ 50. 
93. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) {1998); WIS. STAT. § 402.316(3) {2005-2006). 
94. Chapman v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 699, 708 (B.D. Wis. 1999). 
95. Raskin v. Chrysler Realty Corp., No. 93-1218, 1994 WL 621954, at *4-*5 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 8, 1994); Omernik v. Bushman, 151 Wis. 2d 299, 303, 444 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Ct. 
App.1989). 
96. McCabe, 1996 WL 118456, at *1; Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 49,496 N.W.2d 106, 
112 (Ct. App. 1992). 
97. McCabe, 1996 WL 118456, at *1; Grube,173 Wis. 2d at 62,496 N.W.2d at 118. 
98. WIS. STAT.§ 402.202 {2005-2006). 
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agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are 
within its scope." 99 The rule is a substantive rule of contract law, not 
evidence. 100 Frequently, parties use an integration or merger clause to 
maximize the impact of the parol evidence rule. An integration or 
merger clause is "[a] contractual provision stating that the contract 
represents the parties' complete and final agreement and supersedes all 
informal understandings and oral agreements relating to the subject 
matter of the contract." 101 Thus, the contract consists of only the written 
terms, and nothing extraneous can be considered to add to or vary the 
written contract. The extrinsic evidence barred by the parol evidence 
rule are those terms that reasonably102 or certainly103 would have been 
included in the written contract. The parol evidence rule essentially 
precludes the admissibility of interwoven terms. 
The parol evidence rule as stated in the U.C.C. is silent on whether 
prior or contemporaneous evidence of fraud can be admitted to prove 
the tort of intentional misrepresentation despite the existence of a 
contract that is final and complete. 104 Nevertheless, the U.C.C. cases do 
permit a tort suit for intentional misrepresentation, despite the parol 
evidence rule or an integration clause. 105 The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, on the other hand, expressly recognizes fraud as an exception 
to the parol evidence rule. 106 The courts have uniformly recognized the 
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule despite a party's failure to 
d h 101 • d d' l . t08 • • l 109 I rea t e contract, a s1gne 1sc atmer, or an mtegratwn cause. n 
making the decision whether to admit evidence of fraud in the face of 
the parol evidence rule, the courts have had to weigh the advantage of 
contract certainty against the harm that would result from fraud. The 
courts have concluded that the better public policy is to abandon the 
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(2) (1981). 
100. !d. § 213 cmt. 1; H & M Italian Food Corp. v. Gen. Growth Dev. Corp., No. 88-
1257, 1989 WL 53664, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1989). 
101. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed. 2004). 
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 209(3) (1981). 
103. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1962). 
104. Id. 
105. Franklin v. Lovitt Equip., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1982); George Robberecht 
Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Va. 1979); Cone Mills Corp. v. A.G. 
Estes, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 222,225 (N.D. Ga. 1974). 
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 214 (1981). 
107. Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 155 Wis. 2d 724,732-33,456 N.W.2d 585,589 (1990). 
108. State v. Keehn, 74 Wis. 2d 218, 225, 246 N.W.2d 547, 551 (1976). 
109. See Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 459, 67 N.W.2d 
853, 857 (1955). 
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contract position in favor of redressing the wrong committed by the 
fraud. 110 The same public policy that sanctions the promises obtained by 
deceit must avoid all attempts to circumvent that policy by means of any 
contractual devices, including the parol evidence rule. For courts to rule 
otherwise would open the door to a multitude of frauds that would be 
hidden behind the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule was 
designed to prevent fraud, not to be used to perpetrate fraud.m 
The clear policy is to admit any evidence of intentional 
misrepresentation, despite the parol evidence rule. Upon proof of the 
fraud, punitive damages are often awarded against the tortfeasor. 112 
Paradoxically, a situation may now occur in a contract setting where the 
fraud exception to the parol evidence rule could be used to admit 
evidence of interwoven terms, but the fraud would not be actionable as 
a tort under the narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine because 
the fraud relates to interwoven terms. The point of the fraud exception 
to the parol evidence rule is to punish the deceitful tortfeasor, which, of 
course, will always be defeated by the narrow exception to the economic 
loss doctrine. 
C. Contract Disclaimers and Exculpatory Clauses 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception is against public 
policy because it permits a deceitful person to accomplish indirectly that 
which the person could not accomplish directly through the party's 
contract. Freedom of contract generally leads a court to conclude that 
exculpatory clauses and disclaimers, if fairly bargained, should be 
enforced. 113 On the other hand, tort principles generally cause a court to 
be reluctant to shift the burden from the tortfeasor to the victim who 
has no control or responsibility for the offending conduct. Exculpatory 
clauses, however, can exempt one from liability for negligent behavior 
under prescribed circumstances. 114 As a result, one party insulates 
himself from liability for his negligence. 115 Such contractual provisions 
110. I d. at 460, 67 N.W.2d at 857. 
111. H & M Italian Food Corp. v. Gen. Growth Dev. Corp., No. 88-1257, 1989 WL 
53664, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1989). 
112. See id. at *5. 
113. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, '][ 25, 277 Wis. 2d 303, '][ 25, 691 
N.W.2d 334, '][ 25; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 600, 
345 N.W.2d 417,423 (1984). 
114. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, 'J['J[ 15, 17, 25, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 'J['J[ 15, 17, 25, 691 N.W.2d 334, 
'J['J[ 15, 17, 25; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc., 117 Wis. 2d at 591, 345 N.W.2d at 419. 
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 195(2) (1981). 
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are permitted as acceptable public policy. However, if fraud in the 
inducement is utilized to induce one to sign the exculpatory clause or 
disclaimer, then public policy will not permit enforcement of the 
clauses. 116 On the other hand, public policy dictates that " [a] term 
exempting a party from tort liabiJjty for harm caused intenti nally or 
recklessly is unenforceable. ' 117 Wisconsin c urts have r gularly 
recognized this principJe. m The principle is grounded in und public 
policy that tort law impo es standards of conduct for the protection f 
the public. Thus a party sh uld not be able to exempt himself by 
contract for harm that he or she intentionally or recklessly causes. 11q 
Specifically a party cannot by contract exculpate himself or her elf from 
the legal consequences of fraud. 120 Many year ago, the Wi cousin 
Supreme Court recognized Umt an expres agreement made in a 
conu·act that the contract shall be incontestable for Craud is void as 
against public policy. 121 At least ne state has by tatute prohibited any 
contract term that exempt one for respon ibility for one's intentional 
rnisrepresentation. 122 Such clauses have also been held to be again t 
public policy in securities fraud litigation where the contract eliminates 
the liability for any fraudulent misrepresentations in the ale ( the 
ecw.-ilies. 1v There is a clea1· public policy that a party cann t y 
contract exculpate himself or herself from liability for deceitful conduct. 
Public policy does not permit the torlfea or under any circumstance to 
contract away his responsibility for hi deceitful conduct. Yet the 
narrow exception to th economic loss d ctrine prevents a defrauded 
party fr m uing lhe tortfea or for the intenti nal tort committed when 
the fraud is interwoven with the contract. In other word the deceitful 
person is able to accomplish through the narrow exception (immunity 
from a tort cause of action for deceit) that which one could not 
116. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 215, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982); Anderson v. 
Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 460, 67 N.W.2d 853, 857 (1955); Malas v. 
Lounsbury, 193 Wis. 531, 534, 214 N.W. 332, 333 (1927). 
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 195(1) (1981). 
118. Mala , 193 Wi . at534, 2l4 N.W. at 333; Finch v. oulhsidc Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 
2004 WI App 110, '!!23. 274 Wis. 2d 719,, 23, 6 5 N.W.2d 154,123: Atkins, 2005 WI 4 'l[ 19, 
277 Wis. 2d 303, 1[ J9, 691 N.W.2d 334, ~ 19; RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. First Wis. Nat'l 
Bank, 636 F. upp. 1470, 1474 (E.D. Wi . 1986); Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wi.. 2d 502, 515, 
486 N.W.2d 654, 659 (1991). 
119. Finch, 2004 WI App 110, 'l[ 23, 274 Wis. 2d 719, 9! 23, 685 N.W.2d 154, 9[ 23 . 
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 196 (1981). 
121. Matas, 193 Wis. at 534,214 N.W. at 333. 
122. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1668 (2006) (certain contracts unlawful). 
123. Merzin v. Provident Fin. Group Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (S.D. Ohio 2004). 
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accomplish directly through contract by a disclaimer or exculpatory 
clause. Disclaimers and exculpatory clauses for intentional torts are 
against public policy. The narrow exception, which provides the same 
tort immunity for fraud interwoven with the contract, is similarly against 
public policy. 
D. Contract Principles Summary 
The narrow exception conflicts with established contract principles 
in a number of ways. First, in the case of as is clauses in contracts, any 
fraud or deceit practiced has always taken precedence over such a 
clause. The fraudulent seller is not permitted to hide behind such a 
clause, albeit freely and fairly negotiated for likely a lower sales price. 
The deceit has always been redressed through a tort action. The court's 
focus has not been to require the buyer to protect himself through the 
contract. Rather, the court's approach has been to punish the tortfeasor 
and deter him or her and others who might consider using such 
misconduct in the future. 
Second, the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule was created 
so that the parol evidence rule would not be used to perpetrate frauds 
by excluding evidence of one's fraud. Evidence of fraud has always 
been admissible, despite a written contract that contained an integration 
clause. Once admitted, the fraudulent conduct has always been 
actionable under tort law. The narrow exception to the economic loss 
doctrine, however, conflicts with the policy supporting the creation of 
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. Extrinsic evidence of 
interwoven fraud that would be admitted under the parol evidence rule 
to avoid perpetrating a fraud is not actionable as tortious conduct under 
the narrow exception. Only contract remedies are available. 
Finally, contract law generally tolerates an exculpatory clause in a 
contract that exculpates a party for his or her negligent conduct. On the 
other hand, contract law has never permitted an exculpatory clause to 
exculpate one from one's responsibility for intentional misconduct. This 
has always been prohibited as against public policy. The narrow 
exception's prohibition against tort liability for intentional misconduct 
does indirectly what cannot be done directly in the contra t. The 
narrow exception exculpates one from tort responsibility if th deceit is 
considered to be interwoven fraud. In sum, the narrow exception 
conflicts with established contract principles and i not sound public 
policy. 
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VIII. TORT PRINCIPLES AND FRAUD 
A. Promissory Fraud 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss 
doctrine eliminates the tort of promissory fraud committed in 
conjunctj n with a contract for the sale of a product. A contract is a 
promise or set of promises tbar upon breach the law gives a remedy. m 
A conlractual promise carries with it the imp.lied assertion of the 
promi or s intent to perform the promise. 115 If a contractual promise is 
made without such intent a fraudulent misrepresentation has occurred 
that is actionable. 126 The person misled by the fraudulent 
misrepresentation "has a cause of action in tort as an alternative ... and 
perhaps in some instances in addition to his [or her] cause of action on 
the con tract." 127 
Wisconsin first recognized the tort of promissory fraud in 1938.128 
Since 1938, on at least two other occasions the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has recognized that when a promisor ha no intent to perform its 
contractual promise at the time of contracting, an actionable tort has 
occurred. 129 Promissory fraud is similar to fraud in the inducement. At 
the time of contracting under promissory fraud, the innocent party is 
induced to enter into the contract by the false promises of the tortfeasor. 
The promises made by the tortfeasor are false because the promisor has 
no intention to fulfill them. Similarly, for fraud in the inducement, at 
the time of contracting, the innocent party is induced to enter into the 
contract by the false promises of the tortfeasor. Under both doctrines, 
there is fraudulent inducement, and for promissory fraud, the innocent 
party has a tort action against the tortfeasor. Certainly all the fraud in 
promissory fraud is interwoven fraud since it is the contractual promises 
themselves that are the subject matter of the fraud. Further, it is likely 
that in virtually all promissory fraud cases, the damages will be 
economic loss, not personal injury or other property damage. Thus, 
with the exception of service contracts, 130 nearly seventy years of 
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (1981). 
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 530 cmt. c (1977). 
126. ld. § 530. 
127. ld. § 530 cmt c. 
128. Alropa Corp. v. Flatley, 226 Wis. 561, 565-66, 277 N.W. 108, 110 (1938). 
129. Hartwig v. Bitter, 29 Wis. 2d 653, 656-58, 139 N.W.2d 644, 646-48 (1966); Anderson 
v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 463, 67 N.W.2d 853, 858 (1955) . 
130. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, 9l 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 9[52, 688 
N.W.2d 462, 'j[ 52; see Hartwig, 29 Wis. 2d at 655, 658-59, 139 N.W.2d at 648. 
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Wisconsin precedent are reversed by the narrow exception to the 
economic loss doctrine. 
B. Fraud in the Factum/Execution 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss 
doctrine likely eliminates the tort of fraud in the factum (al o referred to 
as fraud in the execution) committed in conjunction with a contract for 
the ale of a product. The narrow exception mandate that fraud 
interwoven with the contract or involving the performance of the 
contract be addressed through contract remedies, not tort. Only fraud 
extraneous to the contract permits the use of tort remedies. Fraud in 
the factum/execution is fraud that occur "when a legal instrument as 
actually executed differs from the one intended for execution. ' 131 The 
fraud occur because one party procures a party's signature to a contract 
without that party's knowledge of the true nature of the contract. 131 The 
misrepre e.ntation is "to the character or essential terms of a proposed 
contract." 133 The remedy for fraud in the factum/execution is that no 
contract is formed. Punitive damages are often imposed for such fraud 
becau e of the egregious breach of public policy. 134 
Fraud in the inducement occurs "when a misrepresentation leads 
another to enter into a transaction with a false impression of the risks, 
duties, or obligation involved." 135 Fraud in the factum/execution is 
actually a different kind of fraudulent inducement. Rather than 
fraudulently misrepresenting the ri ks, duties, or obligations, the 
tortfeasor mi represent the nature of the contract. The nature of the 
contract is clearly b·aud that is interwoven with the contract or involve 
the contract s performance. Under the narrow exception, thi type of 
fraud would be actionable only through contract remedies. The tort of 
fraud in the factum/execution is arguably eliminated by the narrow 
exception. 
C. Fraudulently Inducing One Not to Enter into a Contract 
The narrow exception's directive that interwoven fraud is not 
actionable in tort fails to recognize the independent, public wrong 
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004). 
132. See id.; see also Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224, 'I! 43, 725 
N.W.2d 944, 'I! 43. 
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 163 cmt a (1981). 
134. Rodriguez v. Horton, 622 P.2d 261, 265 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
135. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004). 
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committed by the seller's deceitful conduct. One who "intentionally and 
improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation" 
by inducing a third person not to enter into a contract has committed an 
actionable tort. 136 This is a statement of public policy. The tort 
specifically covers the same "products" that are the domain of the 
economic loss doctrine. 137 The interference with another's prospective 
contractual relations must be an improper one. "The nature of the 
actor's conduct is a chief factor in determining whether the conduct is 
improper .... "138 An improper interference is specifically defined as 
one characterized by fraudulent misrepresentation. 139 One has a public 
duty not to fraudulently interfere with another's prospective contractual 
relations. There is no contract between the prospective parties, yet a 
societal duty is imposed on a predatory third party. The fraud is not 
tolerated in anticipation of the two parties contracting. Thus, it is clear 
that fraud is punishable as a tort even without contractual relations and 
in fact in anticipation of contractual relations. The harm is the 
intentional interference. The prospective contractual event is the 
occasion for the commission of the tort. The tort is the intentional 
interference that is separate and independent of the prospective 
contract. The societal duty is not to interfere with another's prospective 
contractual relations. One who breaches that societal duty by 
fraudulent conduct has committed an actionable tort independent of the 
prospective contractual relations. 
D. Fraudulently Inducing One Not to Perform a Contract 
The narrow exception's directive that interwoven fraud is not 
actionable in tort fails to recognize the public wrong committed by the 
tortfeasor's deceitful conduct, which is independent of a companion 
breach of contract action. Tort and contract law also intersect when one 
party intentionally and improperly induces another not to perform his or 
her contract. This is also tortious conduct. 140 There is a general duty in 
society not to intentionally interfere with another's reasonable business 
• 141 Th . f l b . 142 expectations. e mter erence must a so e an Improper one. 
Historically, fraud has been identified as one of the means of improper 
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 766B (1979). 
137. !d. § 766B cmt. c. 
138. !d. § 767 cmt. c. 
139. See id. 
140. !d. § 766. 
141. Id. § 766 cmt. b. 
142. !d. § 766 cmt. c. 
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interference. 143 The tortious interferences are often by inducement144 
and predatory in nature. 145 The fact that the plaintiff has a cause of 
action for breach of contract does not preclude the plaintiff from 
maintaining a tort action against the tortfeasor. 146 
Wisconsin has adopted this formulation of tortious interference with 
contract. 147 The use of fraudulent misrepresentation to induce a breach 
of contract is a wrong against the public. 148 The harm is the intentional 
interference, which includes fraud. The contract between the parties is 
the occasion for the tort. The tort is the intentional interference, which 
is separate and independent from the contract. The public duty is 
independent from the contract, which contains the private duties. The 
tortfeasor's fraudulent conduct violates the societal duty not to 
intentionally interfere with another's business relations, and thus it is 
actionable as a tort. The tortfeasor's conduct must be punished to deter 
such future conduct even though the aggrieved party has a companion 
breach of contract action. Public policy demands such predatory 
practices be addressed through tort remedies even though the aggrieved 
party has a breach of contract action against the breaching party. 
E. Duress 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception's directive that 
interwoven fraud is not actionable in tort contradicts well-established 
tort law that requires equally culpable conduct be treated in the same 
manner. Duress is "any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free 
will of a party."149 Under tort law, one who forces another into a 
contractual relationship as a result of an improper threaeso is subject to 
liability. 151 There is generally a duty among members of society not to 
forcibly cause another to enter into a contract. Duress is the breach of 
143. !d. § 766. 
144. !d. § 766 cmt. k. 
145. ld. § 766 cmt. c. 
146. ld. § 766 cmt. v. 
147. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 218-21, 249 
N.W.2d 547, 553-54 (1977); Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'! Farmers Org., 64 Wis. 2d 241, 
257-58, 219 N.W.2d 564, 572-73 (1974). 
148. Pure Milk Prods. Coop. v. Nat'! Farmers Org., 90 Wis. 2d 781, 804, 280 N.W.2d 691, 
702 (1979). 
149. BLACK'S LAW DIRECTORY 542 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting JOHN D. CALAMARI & 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 9-2, at 337 (3d ed. 1987)). 
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 cmt. f (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS§ 176 (1981). 
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 871 (1979). 
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that duty. One who by duress forces another into a contract is subject to 
resciSSion of the contract, 152 compensatory damages, and punitive 
damages. 153 Wisconsin recognizes all forms of duress, including 
business, economic, and physical duress. 154 Wisconsin also recognizes 
that punitive damages are available when one uses duress to force 
another into a contractual relationship. 155 
Under tort law, duress is considered a specie of fraud in which the 
compulsion takes the place of deceit in causing the injury. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses duress and fraud in the same 
section. "One who intentionally deprives another of [a] legally 
protected property interest ... is subject to liability ... if [the] conduct is 
generally culpable .... " 156 Both fraud 157 and duress158 are considered to 
be equally culpable conduct. Both fraud in the inducement and duress 
cause the creation of a contract. The only difference is the nature of the 
culpable conduct. Both, however, are tortious. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides that the remedies for the tort of duress and 
the tort of fraud are the same. 159 Punitive damages are available for 
both fraud and duress under the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 160 As a 
matter of public policy, should there be a difference between cases 
where one forcibly or fraudulently causes another to enter into a 
contract? Duress and fraud are torts that both wrongfully induce the 
formation of a contract. They are equal wrongs of societal duties and 
are recognized as coincident torts. 161 There are no exceptions for any 
kind of conduct that involves duress. There is no exception for 
interwoven terms that limit an aggrieved party to solely contract 
remedies. The breach of duty and societal wrong is independent of the 
contractual relationship. The contract is simply the occasion for the 
tort. An aggrieved person who suffers duress has the full range of tort 
remedies to address the grievous conduct. On the other hand, one who 
suffers from deceitful conduct that is interwoven with the contract has 
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175 (1981). 
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 871 cmt. f, illus. 5 (1979) . 
154. Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 494, 101 N.W.2d 805, 809 (1960). 
155. Frankard v. Amoco Oil Co., 116 Wis. 2d 254, 267-68, 342 N.W.2d 247, 253 (Ct. 
App. 1983). 
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 871 (1979). 
157. Id. § 871 cmt. e. 
158. ld. § 871 cmt. f. 
159. ld. 
160. See generally id. § 870. 
161. Compare id. § 871 cmt. e, with id. § 871 cmt. f. 
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no tort remedies tmder the narrow exception to the economic loss 
doctrine. There should be no exception for fraudulent conduct. The 
fraud require · independent redres as all torts require, in order to 
promote the public good. The narrow exception clearly contradicts 
well-establi bed law and doe not promote the public good. 
F. Conversion by Acting Beyond the Scope of the Contract 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception creates immunity for 
interwoven fraud that cannot be justified by compari on to a parallel 
situation that also involve an intentional tort that con titutes a breach 
of contract. A "[c]onversion is an intentional exerci e of dominion or 
control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of 
an ther.' 162 A negligent interference is not sufficient to be conver i n; 
it must be intentional. 163 There are a number of way to commit the tort 
of conver ion. One particular mean is where a person "is authorized to 
make a particular use of a chattel and uses it in a manner exceeding the 
authorization. ' 1 The actor i liable for conversion. This type of 
conversion frequently arises in case of a bailment eontract. '165 In 
e sence, the gravamen of this tort is an unauthorized u e that exceed 
the limit of the authorization, o as to constitute a material breach of 
the contract. The unauthorized use is a clear breach of the contract, and 
it also con titutes the tort of conversion. The aggrieved party has a 
claim in both contract and tort. 
Wisconsin ca e law ha accepted the principle that an unaut11orized 
use beyond the limits of a contract' authorization is a conversion. 166 In 
Heinen v. Home Mutual Casualty Co. a dealer 's sale of a mobile home 
in a manner contrary to the partie ' contract was held to be a 
conversion. '67 Despite the fact that the improper sale was a material 
breach of the contract, tbe court also recognized the intentional tort. 168 
The analysis for an unauthorized use that exceeds the parameters of the 
parties contract is virtually identical to the situation that arises from 
fraudulently inducing one to enter into a contract. In both situations a 
material breach of the contract ba occurred. In both situation a 
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 222A(1) (1965). 
163. !d. § 224. 
164. !d. § 228. 
165. !d. § 228 cmt. a. 
166. Heinen v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 92 N.W.2d 836, 840 (1958). 
167. !d., 92 N.W.2d at 840. 
168. ld. at 290, 92 N.W.2d at 840. 
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eparately identifiable tort has also occurred. In the ca e of the 
conversion, the aggrieved party has an actionable tort claim, 
notwitb ·tanding a pru·allel breach of contract claim. In the case of the 
.fr audulent inducement, there is an actionable fraud claim only if the 
fraud relate to an extraneous matter to the contract. For fraud that 
relate to the terms of the contract or the contracts performance no 
tort i actionable under the narrow exception. This di parate treatment 
crumot be justified. Surely, deceitful conduct that induce a contract is 
as reprehensible a a matter of public policy as exceeding a contractually 
authorized use. Further, the unauthorized use i by definition a dispute 
that relates to an interwoven term over which the parties negotiated. 
Should the courts create an interwoven exception for thi tortiou 
conduct as well? The answer is "no." There should be no exception for 
tortiou conduct in either situation. 
G. Punitive Damages 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception bas a devastating 
impact on the award of punitive damages in a number of significant 
ways. Fir t, it defeats two of the primary purpo es of punitive damage . 
Second the narrow exception create a judicial exception to the 
Wisconsin statute authorizing punitive damage where none exist . 
Third, the narrow exception opens the door to reprehensible conduct 
that in the recent past has been appropriately redressed by Wisconsin 
courts. 
Pursuant to Wisconsin tatutes, punitive damages may be awarded 
where one party has acted in intentional disregard of the right o the 
other party. ~~~'' ' A per on act in an intentional di regard of the right of 
[another] if the person act with the purpose to disregard the r other' ] 
rights, or is aware that hi or her act are substantially eertain tore ult in 
the plaintiff's rights being di regarded.' 170 For a court to find an 
intentional eli regard of the right of the other party the actor's conduct 
mu t be: (1) deliberate· (2) an actual di regard of the other' property 
right; and (3) ufficiently aggravated to warrant puni hment. m "The 
purpose of punitive damages is to punish ... or deter the wrongdoer and 
others from engaging in similar conduct in thefuture.' ' 172 The amount of 
punitive damages awarded is sucb a sum as will accomplish the dual 
169. WIS. STAT.§ 895.043(3) (2005-2006). 
170. Wis. JI-Civil1707.1 (2007) (punitive damages: non-product liability) . 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
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purposes of punishment and deteiTence."l Significantly, the deterrence 
purpo e i to deter the current tortfeasor and others from committing 
the offending conduct. Punitive damages are rarely available in a 
breach of contract action. In fact punitive damage are only available in 
a contract action when ' the breach is also a tor t for which punitive 
damage are recoverable . " 17~ In other word , despite tbe fact that a 
breach of contract has occmTed, when there i an independent tort, 
punitive damages are available. This is the o-called tort exception to 
the contract rule. 175 
Intentiona l misrepresentation via fraudulent inducement i an 
intentional tort that satisfie the tort exception permitting punitive 
damage , albeit there is also a breach of contract. Historically both the 
breach of contract and independent tort were recognized and 
appropriate damages a sessed. A party's intentional misrepre entation 
that induces the making of a contract gives the aggrieved party the 
power to avoid the contract. 176 It al o give the aggrieved party a claim 
for damages in tort. 117 The narrow exception to the economic loss 
doctrine, however fundamentally changes th:is principle. The narrow 
exception provides that if the intentional mi repre entation relates to a 
matter that is interwoven with the contract, no independent cause of 
action in tort is available.178 Without the independent tort, no punitive 
damages can be awarded. 
Fmther, the adoption of the narrow exception reverses many years 
of well-established and ound Wisconsin jurisprudence regarding 
fraudulent inducement. For example, in Lundin v. Shimanski ,119 the 
eller of a rental property180 fraudulently induced the buyer to enter into 
a purchase contract by falsely representing that the property was 
capable of being rented for income production and that the basement 
173. /d. 
174. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 355 (1981). 
175. /d. § 355 cmt b. 
176. /d. § 164. 
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 525 (1977). 
178. Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, 'l!42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 'll 42, 
699 N.W.2d 205, 'l!42. 
179. 124 Wis. 2d 175,368 N.W.2d 676 (1985). 
180. A rental property likely qualifies as a "product" since the construction of a home, 
Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 'l!25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 'l!25, 699 N.W.2d 189, 'l!25, 
and a 42-unit condominium complex, 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 WI 
94, 'l!67, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 'l!67, 716 N.W.2d 822, 'I! 67, are "products" under the economic loss 
doctrine. 
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was capable of being occupied. 181 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had no 
difficulty in finding the seller's conduct evidenced a reckless disregard 
for the buyer's rights, and it affirmed an award of punitive damages 
against the seller. Significantly, the court noted: 
Punitive damages are awarded to punish wrongdoing. 
To hold that punitive damages are improper in this case 
would shield the defendants from any liability beyond 
the costs of compensating the [plaintiffs] for their costs in 
putting the house in the condition it was represented to 
be in originally. But "putting the cookies back in the jar" 
when caught is not enough. If that result were reached, 
sellers could make any misrepresentation necessary to 
make a sale. If it was not discovered, or was discovered 
but not pursued, the seller would make a windfall gain. 
If the fraud were discovered and successfully proven, the 
seller would only be liable to make good on his 
representations. He would suffer no punishment nor 
would he be deterred from similar conduct in the 
future. 182 
The fraudulent inducement in Lundin related to matters that were 
clearly interwoven as that term is described in the narrow exception. 
Thus, the fraud in the Lundin case would not be punished or deterred 
under the narrow exception. The narrow exception creates the very 
situation that the Supreme Court intended to avoid. 
In Jeffers v. Nysse, 183 the seller fraudulently induced the buyers to 
enter into a purchase contract by knowingly misrepresenting the 
insulation and heating costs for a home184 to be constructed by the 
sellers. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that when a party's 
motive of self-interest rises to the level of disregarding the rights of 
another, punitive damages are awarded to punish the wrongdoing. 185 
Significantly, the court noted that to not allow punitive damages in a 
case like Jeffers "would shield the defendants from any liability beyond 
the costs of compensating the [buyers] for their costs in putting the 
181. Lundin, 124 Wis. 2d at 178-81,368 N.W.2d at 678-79. 
182. Id. at 198-99, 368 N.W.2d at 687 (quoting Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 553, 297 
N.W.2d 495, 499 (1980)). 
183. 98 Wis. 2d at 544-46, 297 N.W.2d at 495-96. 
184. A contract for the construction of a new home is a "product" under the economic 
loss doctrine. Linden, 2005 WI 113, 'J[25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 'J[25, 699 N.W.2d 189, 'J[25. 
185. Jeffers, 98 Wis. 2d at 551, 297 N.W.2d at 498-99. 
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lllf> house in the condition it was represented to be in originally. The 
court indicated that such a remedy would be an in ufficient remedy and 
affirmed the punitive damage award. The court could find no logical 
basis for applying a different punitive damage standard in a ca e of 
fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract than that applied in other 
intentional tort action .1117 The fraud in Jeffers clearly related to matters 
interwoven to the contract and thus the independent tort would not be 
recognized under the narrow exception. Requiring the buyer to 
anticipate fraud and to a sume, allocate or insure again t it i focusing 
on the wrong party to the contract and it is certainly not a ufficient 
basis for applying a different punitive damage standard for ca es of 
fraudulent inducement than that applied in other ca e of intentional 
torts. 
In Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc. 188 a milk farmer entered into a 
contract to sell the farmer's entire output of milk189 to Kraft Food . The 
case was tried before an arbitrator applying Wisconsin law. The 
arbitrator found that Kraft's agent intentionally misrepresented to the 
farmer that they could get out of the contract at any time by paying one 
month's penalty. The farmers indicated that Kraft s agent "lied to get us 
to ign." 190 The arbitrator determined that Kraft intentionally 
disregarded the farmers' rights and awarded punitive damages against 
Kraft. On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the arbitrator's award of 
punitive damages. 191 Unquestionably the fraudulent inducement 
concerned the farmer ' ability to terminate the contract, which is a term 
that would be interwoven under the narrow exception. Thus the 
intentional tort would not be actionable, and no punitive damages 
would be awarded for the agent's lies. 
In Rowell v. Ash/92 the seller of a mobile home park 193 concealed 
defects in the park's septic and well system. The trial court refused to 
186. Id. at 553, 297 N.W.2d at 499. 
187. Id. at 551, 297 N.W.2d at 499. 
188. 2005 WI App 25, 'll 2, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 'J[2, 693 N.W.2d 756, 'll 2. 
189. This is an output contract under Wisconsin Statutes section 402.306, and the 
tran action i covered by the U.C.C. 
190. Winkelman, 2005 WI App 25, ~ 3, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 'll 3, 693 N.W.2d 756, 'll 3. 
191. ld. II 1 279 Wis. 2d 335,11, 693 N.W.2d 756, 'lll. 
192. No. 98-2904-FT, 1999 WL 326205 (Wi . Ct. App. May 25, 1999). 
193. A mobile home park llkely qualifies as a "product" since the con truction of a 
home, Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, Cf 25, 283 Wi . 2d 606 i 25, 699 N.W.2d 
189, Cf 25, and a 42-unil condominium complex, 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group Ltd., 
2006 WI 94, 'j{ 67, 293 Wis. 2d 410, Cjl67, 716 N.W.2c.I 822, 'j{ 67. are "products" under the 
economic loss doctrine. 
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submit the buyers' claim for punitive damages to the jury. 194 On appeal, 
the court of appeals held that the buyers were entitled to a new trial on 
the issue of punitive damages. The appeals court noted that a jury 
question was fairly presented whether the sellers intentionally 
disregarded the buyers' rights. 195 The buyers asserted that the 
concealment of the defective well and septic system induced the sales 
contract and thereby disregarded their rights. 196 The state of the mobile 
home park's well and septic system was clearly interwoven with the sale 
of the park. Thus, under the narrow exception only the breach of 
contract action is available, and no jury question is presented for 
punitive damages. 
In Sassara v. Braun, 197 a buyer purchased a plane198 upon the seller's 
"representations that the plane had an airworthiness certificate and a 
fresh annual inspection." Both representations were knowingly false. 
The buyer brought an action to rescind the contract because of the 
intentional misrepresentation and also sought punitive damages. The 
court noted that although punitive damages are not available in a breach 
of contract action, they are available if the defendant has committed a 
tort and a breach of contract. 199 The court characterized the buyer's case 
as a fraud case seeking the remedy of rescission. In the court's opinion, 
this was not a straight breach of contract case. The court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court's damage award, which rescinded the contract; 
returned the purchase price, plus prejudgment interest; awarded 
incidental expenses; and awarded punitive damages for the seller's 
fraudulent inducement. 200 Under the narrow exception to the economic 
loss doctrine, no tort would be recognized for the seller's lies regarding 
the plane's airworthiness and current annual inspection. Both items are 
interwoven with the contract, and thus no independent tort is 
available. 201 
194. Rowell, 1999 WL 326205, at *2. 
195. !d. at *6. 
196. /d. at *1-2. See Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 30-31, 288 N.W.2d 95, 
102 (1980); Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, '1[13, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '1[13, 
699 N.W.2d 205, '1[13 (finding that failing to satisfy a duty to disclose serves as a basis for a 
fraudulent inducement to contract claim). 
197. No. 95-3300, 1997 WL 164020, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1997). 
198. A U.C.C. transaction and clearly the sale of a "product" under the economic loss 
doctrine. 
199. Sassara, 1997 WL 164020, at *5. 
200. !d. at *1-2. 
201. One could argue the "public safety" exception to the economic loss doctrine, but 
that exception has not been expanded beyond the use of asbestos in a shopping center. See 
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The narrow exception, by limiting a defrauded party to olely its 
contract remedy, provides little di incentive to an unscrupul us party. 
In Radford v. J.J.B. Enterprises) Ltd. 202 two buyers pW'chased a boaecll 
that subsequently leaked due to dry rot in the boat's bull. The jury 
found that the seller intentionally misrepresented the oundness of the 
boat's hull prior to the sale.2().1 The seller represented to the buyers that 
all the dry rot was removed from the hull, and it wa ound and 
seaworthy. The court noted that '[i]t [wa ] hard to imagine a 
repre entation more important to a prospective boat owner than 
soundnes of the boat s bull. ,lOS The seller s tatements about the boat's 
hull concerned the fundamental element that makes a boat a boat. The 
jury found that the sellers fraudulently induced the buyers to purchase 
the boat and awarded compensatory and punitive damage . The court 
of appeals confirmed the damage awards.2()(i Under the narrow 
exception to the economic los doctrine, the soundness of the hull would 
certainly be a matter interwoven with the contract.207 As such, the tort is 
not actionable and no punitive damage would be available to deter thi 
boat seller or others from lying in the future. 
In Smith v. Adcock, 2fJ8 a buyer was induced to purchase a 50% 
interest in a horse209 by fraudulent misrepresentations by the seller. The 
misrepresentations concerned the timing and terms of reselling the 
horse. Upon a finding of fraudulent inducement the jury assessed 
$25,000 in punitive damages against the seller. 210 Under the narrow 
exception the seller's fraud arguably related to matters interwoven with 
the contract and thus it is not actionable in tort. No punitive damages 
would be asses ed for the seUer' fraud or to deter other seller . 
Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 922, 937-38, 471 N.W.2d 179, 180, 186 
(1991). 
202. 163 Wis. 2d 534, 541, 472 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Ct. App. 1991). 
203. A U.C.C. transaction and clearly a sale of a "product" under the economic loss 
doctrine. 
204. Radford, 163 Wis. 2d at 539, 472 N.W.2d at 792. 
205. Id. at 544, 472 N.W.2d at 794. 
206. !d. at 548-59, 472 N.W.2d at 796. 
207. One could argue the "public safety' exception to the economic loss doctrine, but 
that exception has not been expanded beyond the use of asbestos in a shopping center. See 
Northridge Co., 162 Wis. 2d at 922. 937- 38, 471 N.W.2d at 180, 186. 
208. Smith v. Adcock, No. 87-0088, 1987 WL 29666, at *1, *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 
1987). 
209. A U.C.C. transaction and clearly a sale of a "product" under the economic loss 
doctrine. 
210. Smith, 1987 WL 29666, at *2. 
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Finally, in Spore v. Woodley, 211 buyers purchased a resore12 from the 
sellers based on the sellers' representations regarding the resort's gross 
revenues. Subsequent to the sale, it was determined that the amount of 
gros revenues stated by the seller was false. The buyers sought 
re ci ion for the intentional mi representation and punitive damages. 
The trial court granted rescis ion of the contract and awarded restitution 
of monies paid by the buyer ; prejudgment interest on the monies paid; 
incidental damages; and punitive damage . On appeal the court 
affirmed the award of punitive damages for the intentional 
misrepresentation committed by the sellers. 113 Eraudulently 
misrepresenting the amount of gross revenues was one of the essential 
terms relied upon by the buyer that induced the buyer to purchase the 
re ort. It was clearly interwoven with the contract negotiations. 
Nevertheless, under the narrow exception, the tort is not actionable, and 
the buyer has only contract damages available. No punitive damages 
are available. 
The simplest analysis of the impact of the narrow exception to the 
economic loss doctrine on the award of punitive damages reflects that it 
is not sound public policy for a number of reasons. First, the narrow 
exception defeats two of the primary purposes of punitive damages, 
which are to punish and deter a deceitful tortfeasor and to deter others 
from using deceit in contract negotiations. The narrow exception 
ignores the tort in cases of fraud that are interwoven with the contract's 
formation. Thus, no punitive damages are available. Second, Wisconsin 
statutes authorize punitive damages where one party intentionally 
disregards the rights of another. There is no statutory exception for 
intentionally interfering with another s rights where the tort is fraud that 
is interwoven with a contract's formation. The narrow exception is a 
judicially created exception to a legislative enactment that has no 
exceptions. In addition, in 1995, when the punitive damage statute was 
passed, the supreme court had already upheld the award of punitive 
damages in the preceding fraudulent inducement cases. 214 If the 
211. No. 85-0874, 1986 WL 217380 (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 1986). 
212. A resort likely qualifies as a "product" since the construction of a home, Linden v. 
Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, !][ 25, 283 Wis. 2d 606, !][ 25, 699 N.W.2d 189, !][ 25, and the 
sale of a 42-unit condominium complex, 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 2006 
WI 94, !][ 67,293 Wis. 2d 410, !][ 67, 716 N.W.2d 822, 'J[ 67, are "products" under the economic 
loss doctrine. 
213. Spore, 1986 WL 217380, at *2. 
214. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text (discussing supreme court decisions 
on punitive damages). 
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legislature had intended to reverse those award by creating an 
exception, it would have done so. It did not. The inference is clear that 
no exceptions to the punitive damage statute should exi t. 
Finally, many years of Wisconsin jurisprudence bave recognized the 
tort when one fraudulently induced another t enter into a contract with 
lies and deceit. The conduct has always been punished by punitive 
damages. Unfortunately, the adoption of the narrow exception reverses 
many years of well-established and sound Wisconsin jurisprudence 
regarding fraudulent inducement. 
H. The Duty of Honesty and Fair Dealing 
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of honesty215 and fair 
dealing. 216 A tort approach rather than a contract approach most 
effectively promotes this public policy of honesty and fair dealing 
between contracting parties. 
Oftentimes, a breach of a contract duty and tort duty will overlap. 
"Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a tort, but a contract may create 
the state of things which furnishes the occasion of a tort. "211 For 
example, "[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to 
perform with care, skill, [and] reasonable expedience" the contractual 
duties. 218 A negligent failure to perform such duties i a tort as well as a 
breach of contrace19 Under such circumstances the aggrieved party has 
a cause of action in both contract and tort and can often choose between 
the two. 220 The economic loss doctrine, however, provides that a tort 
cause of action is not available if the breach of duty has caused only 
economic loss. The societal interest in the duty to perform the contract 
duties is not significant enough to permit a tort cause of action that 
ignores the contract terms. The contract remedy is the only remedy 
available. 
215. The actual duty stated is "good faith and fair dealing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Honesty and good faith are interchangeable, thus the duty of 
honesty and fair dealing. /d. § 205 cmt. a. 
216. Specifically, the Restatement provides this duty in the performance and 
enforcement of the contract, not at formation. ld. § 205 cmts. a, b. However, the Wiscon in 
Supreme Court has recognized this duty at formation in Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 
2d 17, 50-51, 288 N.W.2d 95, 111 (1980), and Kaloti Enterprises., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 
2005 Wt 111, ~ 20,283 Wis. 2d 555, <i 20, 699 N.W.2d 205,lf 20. 
217. Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 146,47 N.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (quoting 38 AM. 
JUR. Negligence§ 20 (1941)). 
218. ld., 47 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting 38 AM. JUR. Negligence§ 20 (1941)). 
219. Brooks v. Hayes,133 Wis. 2d 228, 235,395 N.W.2d 167, 170 (1986). 
220. ld. at 246, 395 N.W.2d at 174. 
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A more difficult problem arises, however, when a contracting party 
is fraudulently induced to enter into a contract. The contractual duties 
arising from the contract exist. The societal duty to perform the 
contractual duties with reasonable care also exists. But, with the 
fraudulent inducement, an additional societal duty is breached. 
Wisconsin has a deeply rooted history in requiring honesty and fair 
dealing between contracting parties. 221 The duty protects the public 
interest in "formulating business judgments without being misled by 
others-that is, the interest in not being cheated. "222 The societal duty 
to promote honesty and fair dealing in contractual relations includes the 
duty not to lie and a duty to disclose material facts in certain 
circumstances. 223 Thus, the issue becomes whether the economic loss 
doctrine should still apply in the face of a party's fraudulent inducement. 
The narrow exception adopted in Kaloti provides that contract law 
shall control the parties' dispute, despite one party's deceitful conduct, 
provided the fraud relates to matters interwoven with the contract. On 
the other hand, if the fraud relates to extraneous matters, then tort 
remedies are available. In most cases of fraud in the inducement, the 
fraud will relate to an interwoven matter. 224 In such cases, the contract 
remedies are the only ones available, not tort remedies. Thus, the 
societal duty to promote honesty and fair dealing is ignored. There is no 
price paid by the tortfeasor for his or her deceit. There is no message 
sent to others similarly situated to deter them from perpetrating 
fraudulent conduct. The predatory practices can continue, and the 
tortfeasor's greatest exposure is to pay damages for the difference 
between the product's actual value and the value as fraudulently 
represented. 225 There is no exposure to punitive damages to punish the 
tortfeasor for his or her repugnant conduct. There is no punitive 
damage message to deter others from committing such predatory 
practices. In fact, the societal concern is completely ignored by adopting 
the narrow exception unless the fraud is found to be extraneous. 
The rationale supporting the narrow exception is that the aggrieved 
party should negotiate his or her protection in the contract. There are, 
however, shortcomings to that rationale. First, should parties in a 
221. Ollerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 50-51, 288 N.W.2d at 111; Kaloti Enters., Inc., 2005 WI 111, 
'![ 47, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 47, 699 N.W.2d 205, '![ 47. 
222. 0/lerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 30,288 N.W .2d at 101. 
223. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. , 2005 WI 111, '![ 20, 283 Wis. 2d 555, '![ 20, 699 N.W.2d 205, 
'![ 20. 
224. See discussion supra Part VI (identifying the rare cases of extraneous fraud). 
225. Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 195,368 N.W.2d 676, 686 (1985). 
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contract negotiation expect honesty and fair dealing from the other 
party, or expect fraud? The better policy would be to expect and 
encourage honesty and fair dealing, not fraud. Second, even if one party 
anticipates all the protection available by contract and negotiates 
contract warranty protection from fraud, the only remedy available to 
the aggrieved party in the event of fraud is the breach of contract action. 
Is it likely that the parties' negotiations will include a contract clause 
that makes punitive damages available in the event one party commits 
fraud? I think not. Further, should the promotion of such an important 
public policy be left to private contracting parties, or is this a matter best 
left to tort law to promote the societal interest? It seems clear that the 
public policy to promote honesty and fair dealings is most effectively 
promoted by a tort approach rather than a contract approach. The 
Wisconsin Statutes and Department of Agriculture, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection ("DATCP") regulations that redress falsely 
induced contracts use the tort approach, not the contract approach. 226 
The legislative approach uses the threat of costs and punitive damages 
to deter falsely induced contracts and to promote honesty and fair 
dealing between contracting parties. There is no exception for any kind 
of fraudulently induced contract. The legislature has chosen the tort 
approach to effectuate the duty of honesty and fair dealing. The courts 
should use the same approach. 
I. Tort Principles Summary 
The narrow exception clearly conflicts with established tort 
principles. First, a number of torts may be completely eliminated by the 
narrow exception. Promissory fraud is a tort that occurs when a 
promisor has no intent to perform a contractual promise at the time of 
contracting. It has been recognized in Wisconsin for seventy years. The 
narrow exception eliminates the tort of promissory fraud because a tort 
claim cannot be asserted for interwoven fraud. Since promissory fraud 
is fraud that relates to the actual promises in the contract, it is, by 
definition, interwoven fraud, not extraneous fraud. Any tort action 
under the narrow exception for interwoven fraud can only be brought as 
a contract action. Thus, the tort of promissory fraud has been 
eliminated. 
Also, fraud in the factum/execution occurs when one misrepresents 
the character or nature of a contract and procures another's signature to 
it. Fraud in the factum/execution has always been recognized as a 
226. See infra Part IX. 
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breach of one's public duty and a tort. The fraud relates to the 
character or nature of the contract and, as such, is the epitome of an 
interwoven term. Thus, under the narrow exception the tort claim is 
barred. 
Second, there are a number of torts that are actionable because the 
societal wrong committed is separate and independent from the contract 
or prospective contractual relations. The contract is simply the occasion 
for the tort. The narrow exception fails to recognize this principle. For 
example fraudulently inducing one not to enter into a contract or to 
perform one's contract is actionable as a tort despite the contractual 
background. Similarly, duress and fraud are actionable torts that both 
procure the creation of a cont:ract. The contract is the occasion for the 
tort. A contract is formed under both circumstances. But there are two 
independent wrongs committed in the contracting process. One is fraud, 
and the other is compulsion. Tort law treats them as equal wrongs and 
actionable as such. The narrow exception precludes the tort action for 
interwoven fraud and thereby fails to recognize the deceit as a wrong 
independent from the contract. This is a significant failure of the 
exception. 
Third, the narrow exception provides disparate treatment to parallel 
tort situations. The intentional tort of conversion occurs when the 
bailee in a bailment contract exceeds the authorized level of use 
specified in the contract. The unauthorized use is a material breach of 
contract. The unauthorized use is also a conversion under tort law. 
Similar to the situation of fraudulent inducement, the fraudulent 
inducement is a material breach of contract and also an intentional tort. 
In the bailment situation, the tort is actionable despite the companion 
breach of contract action. Under the narrow exception, the fraudulent 
inducement is not actionable if the fraud relates to interwoven terms. 
These are parallel situations that are treated differently under the law. 
Surely the deceitful conduct is a greater societal wrong than exceeding 
the authorized use in the contract. 
Fourth, the narrow exception seriously undercuts the availability, 
purpose, and power of punitive damages. The victims of deceitful 
conduct are granted the right by statute to pursue punitive damages 
upon satisfying the statute's requirements. 227 The narrow exception, by 
barring tort actions for interwoven fraud, is a judicially created 
exception to the punitive damage statute, where no exceptions were 
authorized by the statute. Further, the narrow exception, by not 
227. WIS. STAT.§ 895.043 (2005-2006). 
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permitting a tort action for interwoven fraud, defeats two of the primary 
purposes for punitive damages. It fails to punish and deter the 
tortfeasor, and it fails to deter others from engaging in fraudulent 
conduct in the future. Finally, and perhaps most distressing, the narrow 
exception prevents the assessment of punitive damages in many cases of 
egregious deceit that have been justifiably punished for many years in 
Wisconsin courts. The litany of past fraudulent actors that will now be 
able to avoid the full consequences of their deceit under the narrow 
exception is simply unjust. 
Fifth, Wisconsin's proud history, which requires honesty and fair 
dealing between contracting parties, is not promoted by the narrow 
exception. Societal duties are advanced through tort law, and private 
duties are advanced through contract law. The duty of honesty and fair 
dealing is a public duty that is important enough to require a tort 
approach, not a contract approach. The narrow exception's insistence 
on a contract approach is not sufficient to ensure maximum compliance 
with the public duty of honesty and fair dealing. 
IX. THESTATUTORY AND REGULATORY APPROACHTO 
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
A. Statutory Fraudulent Inducement 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception conflicts with 
Wisconsin's fraudulent inducement statute. In 1995, the legislature 
passed Wisconsin Statutes section 895.80, which provides that "[a]ny 
person who suffers damage or loss by reason of intentional conduct that 
occurs on or after November 1, 1995" and also is in violation of 
Wisconsin Statutes section 943.20228 has a statutory cause of action 
against the person who caused the damage or loss. 229 One violates 
section 943.20 by obtaining "title to property of another person by 
intentionally deceiving the person with a false representation which is 
known to be false, made with intent to defraud, and which does defraud 
the person to whom it is made."230 A "'[f]alse representation' includes a 
promise made with intent not to perform it if it is part of a false and 
fraudulent scheme."231 The legislature has made a decision that any 
228. Wisconsin Statutes chapter 943 is "crimes against property," and section 943.20 
specifically covers theft. 
229. WIS. STAT. § 895.446 (2005-2006) (action for property damage or loss caused by 
crime) (previously section 895.80). 
230. ld. § 943.20(1)(d). 
231. ld. 
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person who suffers a criminal fraud in the inducement has a statutory 
civil cause of action against the person who caused the damage or loss. 232 
Significantly, the authorizing statute further provides that a successful 
plaintiff is authorized to recover actual damages, all costs of 
investigation and litigation, and exemplary damages of not more than 
three times the actual damages. 233 Further, the legislature has defined 
those damages that are recoverable as "actual damages," which includes 
"the retail or replacement value of damaged, used, or lost property, 
whichever is the greater." 234 The itemized damages are clearly economic 
loss damages. 235 The legislature has also authorized exemplary damages, 
which are punitive damages. 236 The punitive damages are available 
without any additional proof other than that a criminal fraud in the 
inducement has occurred. 237 Finally, the legislature also authorized 
recovery for all the costs of any investigation and litigation, which 
includes the value of time spent on the matter. 238 Obviously, the 
legislature has made a significant public policy decision that criminal 
fraud in the inducement authorizes a civil fraud in the inducement case. 
The narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine is in direct 
conflict with this legislative enactment. The narrow exception provides 
that fraud in the inducement that relates to interwoven terms can only 
be brought under contract law. The narrow exception clearly precludes 
a statutorily authorized civil cause of action for criminal fraud in the 
inducement. As such, the narrow exception is in conflict with the 
authorizing statute.239 
There is only one decision addressing the conflict between the 
narrow exception and the authorizing statute. In Below v. Norton, 240 
buyers purchased a home after the sellers disclosed that the only 
plumbing defect was a defective bathtub drain handle. Subsequently, it 
was "discovered that the sewer line between the house and the street 
232. Jd. § 895.446(1). There are actually seventeen separate criminal statutory sections 
that, if violated, also give rise to a civil cause of action. !d. 
233. Jd. § 895.446(3). 
234. !d. § 895.446(3)(a). 
235. See supra Part V (defining economic loss damages). 
236. WIS. STAT.§ 895.446(3)(c). 
237. !d. 
238. !d. § 895.446 (3)(b). 
239. See id. § 895.446. 
240. No. 2005AP2855, 2006 Wise. App. LEXIS 1092 (Nov. 21, 2006) (awaiting 
publication). 
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was broken."241 In their uit the buyers alleged a statutory fraud in the 
inducement action. he court of appeals appli d tbe narrow exception 
adopted in Kctloti and reasoned Lhat the fraud in the inducement wa not 
a matter unrelated" to the contract. 242 A such tb · conomic I ss 
doctrine barred the statutorily authorized fraud in the inducement 
action. !~] Thi approach by the c urts i in direct contravention to tb 
legislature's public policy decision. 
" [D]etennination of pub.lic policy is a matter p1·imarily for th 
legislature, and where tbe legi lature has clearly stated it policy in the 
form fa statute, ... that detennination is binding on ... the courts. 24'1 
'LI]L is Lhe duty of lthe] court to apply the policy the 1egislatuTe has 
codified in the tatute not [to] impose [its] own policy ctJOices. " 245 
Otherwise, the courts act as a super-Legislature. The enactment f the 
criminal Jraucl i11 the inducement statute is a public p licy statement that 
fraud in tl1e inducement is a serious matter of public concem. In fact, it 
can ri e to the level of criminal activity. The commjssion of criminal 
fraud in the inducement begets a statutory civil fraud in the inducement 
cau e of action. Whether the fTaud wa extraneous or interwoven with 
the c ntract is n · t part of the analysis. The narrow exception clearLy 
conflicts with th statutory auiliorization and cannot stand. 
B. Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the ec nomic los 
doctrine i completely eclipsed by the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act ("DTPA"). Chapter 100 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
regulates marketing and trade practices. It is commonly refened to as 
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. A significant part of the statut 
d aJs directly with · ·ller fraudulently inducing contracts for various 
products and services. The DTPA applies to consumer and commerciaL 
transactions. Obviously, the sale of products that result in economic lo s 
to the buyer would b subject to the economic lo s doctrine. be sa.le of 
s rvices,:w, of cour e would not be subject to the doctrine.247 The DTPA 
241. !d. 
242. !d. 
243. !d. 
244. Sinclair v. Dep't Health & Soc. Servs., 77 Wis. 2d 322, 335, 253 N.W.2d 245, 251 
(1977). 
245. Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 'll 34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 
9[ 34, 671 N.W.2d 633, 9[ 34. 
246. See, e.g., Wrs. STAT.§ 100.177 (2005-2006) (noting that a fitness center is a business 
whose primary purpose is to provide services). 
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prohibits and sanctions sellers that fraudulently induce sales of 
particular products. For example, no person may make untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading representations to induce a contract for the sale 
of drugs,248 the sale of food, 249 the sale of a vehicle product warranty,250 
or the sale of a vehicle rust-proofing warranty. 251 For those fraudulently 
induced sales not covered by a specific statutory section, there is one 
section that provides very broad coverage. No person may make 
"untrue, deceptive or misleading" representations to induce a contract for 
the "purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any real estate, merchandise, 
securities, employment or services," or anything else. 252 In addition to the 
express statutory prohibitions against fraudulently inducing contracts, 
there are companion provisions prohibiting deceptive advertising that 
may lead to the formation of a contract. 253 The statute further provides 
that a person suffering pecuniary loss because of any statutory violation 
may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and recover his or her 
pecuniary loss, together with costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 254 
This is a statutory remedy that supplements any other remedies an 
aggrieved person possesses. 255 The purpose of all the statutory 
prohibitions against fraudulently inducing one into a contract is to 
protect the public from untrue, deceptive, or misleading 
representations. 256 The DTP A is a clear statement of public policy 
sanctioning sellers who fraudulently induce contracts. 
The narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine provides that a 
fraudulent inducement that relates to the terms and conditions of the 
contract is actionable only for breach of contract. That principle directly 
contradicts the DTP A mandate, which provides an independent cause 
of action for any fraudulent inducement that falls within the scope of the 
statute. The courts that have addressed the relationship between the 
economic loss doctrine and the DTP A's statutory prohibition and 
remedy have reached conflicting results. Some courts have concluded 
247. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, 'li 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 'li 52, 688 
N.W.2d 462, 'li 52. 
248. WIS. STAT. § 100.182(2) (2005-2006). 
249. !d. § 100.183(1). 
250. ld. § 100.203. 
251. Id. § 100.205(5)(a). 
252. Id. § 100.18(1). 
253. !d. § 100.18(2), (3), (3m), (9)(a), and (10m). 
254. !d. § 100.18(11)(b)2. 
255. See Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, 'li'li 40-42, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 'li'J[ 40-42, 643 
N.W.2d 132 'li'li 40-42. 
256. Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 57, 496 N.W.2d 106, 116 (1992). 
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that where the economic loss doctrine bars claims of common law 
fraudulent inducement (interwoven fraud), the economic loss doctrine 
also bars claims under the DTP A. 257 Others have concluded that the 
economic loss doctrine should not bar fraudulent inducement claims 
under the DTPA. 258 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not yet decided 
the issue, although in dictum it suggested that the economic loss 
doctrine may not be a bar to a claim under the DTP A. 259 
The weight of case authority clearly indicates that the economic loss 
doctrine should not be a bar to any fraudulent inducement actions under 
the DTPA whether the fraudulent inducement relates to interwoven or 
extraneous matters. The weight of authority is correct. 
"[D]etermination of public policy is a matter primarily for the 
legislature, and where the legislature has clearly stated its policy in the 
form of a statute, ... that determination is binding on ... the courts."260 
If the supreme court and the legislature differ on public policy, the 
legislature's view must control. 261 The supreme court's Kaloti decision, 
adopting the principle that contracts induced by fraud on interwoven 
terms can be brought only in contract, directly conflicts with the 
statutory mandate of the DTP A and its companion sections. The 
DTP A sections supersede the narrow exception, not vice versa. Thus, 
an aggrieved party that is fraudulently induced to purchase a "product" 
can sue under Wisconsin Statutes section 100.18 to recover his or her 
pecuniary loss and attorneys fees despite the fact that the fraud may be 
interwoven. 
In addition, punitive damages are also available as part of a claim 
asserted under the DTP A if the prerequisites for punitive damages are 
257. MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 873, 886 
(W.D. Wis. 2002); Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. PPG Indus., No. 97-C-707-S, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22489, at *11-*15 (W.D. Wis. June 10, 1998). 
258. Dow v. Poltzer, 364 F. Supp. 2d 931 , 938-39 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Seibel v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., No. 97-C-0874-S, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19903, at *7, *10 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 1998); 
Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Wis. 1997); Peterson v. 
Cornerstone Prop. Dev., LLC, 2006 WI App 132, 'II 30,299 Wis. 2d 800, '1!30, 720 N.W.2d 716, 
'J[30; Carlson v. Gleichsner, No. 04-1376,2005 WL 241168, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2005); 
Kailin, 2002 WI App 70, 'll'Jl 42--43,252 Wis. 2d 676, 'l!'ll42--43, 643 N.W.2d 132, 'll'll 42--43. 
259. Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 'll 23, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 'll 23, 683 N.W.2d 46, 
'1! 23. 
260. Sinclair v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 77 Wis. 2d 322, 335, 253 N.W.2d 245, 251 
(1977) . 
261. Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 'll 34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 
'l! 34, 671 N.W.2d 633, 'II 34. 
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satisfied. 262 Wisconsin law requires a showing that the defendant either 
acted maliciously or in intentional disregard of the rights of the injured 
party. 263 Thus, the DTPA statutory claim is tantamount to a tort claim, 
not a contract claim. 
The elements for a common law fraud in the inducement claim in 
Wisconsin are: (1) the defendant makes a factual representation; (2) the 
representation is untrue; (3) the defendant knowingly or recklessly 
made the untrue representation; (4) the representation is made with the 
intent to defraud; (5) the aggrieved party reasonably relies on the 
representation; and ( 6) the representation occurred before the contract 
was formed. 264 The elements of a statutory claim for fraudulent 
inducement under the DTP A require that (1) the representation occurs 
before the contract is formed; (2) the representation must be untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading; and (3) the representation must be to the 
public. 265 Some courts have also suggested that the aggrieved party must 
reasonably rely on the representation as well. 266 
A simple comparison suggests that the two differences between the 
DTPA statutory claim of fraudulent inducement and a common law 
claim are the requirements of the intent element in the common law 
claim and the representation to the "public" in the statutory claim. Case 
law decided under the DTP A is clear that a representation between two 
contracting parties prior to contracting satisfies the statutory public 
requirement. 267 Thus, no difference exists between the statutory and 
common law claims on the statutory public requirement. The only 
significant difference between the two claims is that the common law 
262. Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 548-49, 472 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Ct. 
App. 1991); H ines v. Camosy, No. 88-2247, 1989 WL 142779, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 
1989). 
263. WIS. STAT. § 895.043(3) (2005- 2006) . 
264. See Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, '][ 12, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 
'][ 12, 699 N.W.2d 205, '][ 12. 
265. WIS. STAT. §100.18 (2005-2006) (fraudulent representations). 
266. Novell v. Migliaccio, No. 2005AP2852, 2006 WL 2947041, at *3, (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 
17, 2006); Below v. Norton, No. 2005AP2855, 2006 Wise. App. LEXIS 1092, at *8 (Nov. 21, 
2006) . 
267. Sta te v. A utoma tic Merchandisers of Am., Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659 66J-65, 221 N.W.2d 
683, 686 (1974); Kail in v. Armstrong, 2002 WI A pp 70, ~ 44, 252 Wis. 2d 676, <J[ 44, 643 
.W.2d 132, t 44; K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2006 WI App 148 
'l[ 23, 720 N.W.2d 507, ~ 23. But see D & B A uto. Equip., Inc. v. Snap-On. Jnc., o. 03-CV-
141 , 2006 U .. D ist. LEXIS 17329, at *17, *21 (E.D. Wi . Mar. 27, 2006); Donisi v. McGann, 
o. 2005AP1748-Ff 2005 WL 3116170, at ~u (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005); Mayville Die & 
Tool, Jnc. v. Weller Mach. Co. , No. OJ -1509-FT, 2001 WL 1512917, 1 3 (Wi . Ct. App. Nov. 
29, 2001). 
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claim has an intent element that must be satisfied. The statutory claim 
does not require proof of any intent to make a false representation, and 
thus is intent-neutral. 268 Since all of the elements for the statutory and 
common law claims of fraudulent inducement are the same, with only 
the one exception, the statutory claim will be easier to prove than the 
common law claim. Further, the statutory claim covers contracts that 
relate to real estate, merchandise, securities, employment, service, or 
"anything offered to the public for sale, hire, use, or lease. "269 The scope 
of the statutory claim of fraudulent inducement is much broader than 
the narrower scope of the economic loss doctrine which applies only to 
contracts for "products." Thus, one can fairly conclude that the DTPA 
statutory claim for fraudulent inducement renders the economic loss 
doctrine, and its appendant issue of whether the fraud is interwoven or 
extraneous, a moot question. In sum, the DTP A renders the narrow 
exception meaningless as a matter of implicit preemption by the 
DTP A's statutory authorization or moot because of the broader scope 
of the DTPA. 
C. The Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
Regulations 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss 
doctrine conflicts with the regulations promulgated by the DATCP and 
its authorizing statutes. The Wisconsin legislature granted the DATCP 
the authority to promulgate regulations to implement chapters 93-100 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes.270 The regulations promulgated by the DATCP 
have the force of law. 271 In addition, section 100.20 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes grants the DATCP the authority to promulgate regulations that 
forbid unfair methods of competition or trade practices. 272 The DATCP 
has promulgated a series of rules that have a diverse scope. In large 
part, the regulations specify and prohibit a number of unfair trade 
practices that fraudulently induce contracts. The specific statutory areas 
prohibiting fraudulently induced contracts are: home improvement 
• 273 b f' . 274 1 practices; asement waterproo mg practices; rea estate 
268. Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2006 WI App 184, <J[ 28, 722 N.W.2d 
766, <J[ 28. 
269. WIS. STAT.§ 100.18(1) (2005-2006) (emphasis added). 
270. !d. § 93.07(1) (department duties). 
271. !d. 
272. !d. § 100.20(2) (methods of competition and trade practices). 
273. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 110.02 (2004). 
274. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 111.03 (2006). 
966 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [90:921 
advertising;275 art prints and multiple art sales practices;276 chain 
distribution schemes;277 telecommunications and cable television 
services;278 mobile home parks;279 direct marketing;280 coupon sales 
promotions;281 and motor vehicle repair. 282 Some of the prohibitions 
apply to only consumer contracts,283 and others have application to 
commercial and consumer contracts. 284 
The DATCP regulation with the broadest application to the 
economic loss doctrine is DATCP section 127, which regulates direct 
marketing. The direct marketing regulation applies to consumer 
transactions in goods and services. 285 DATCP section 127 provides that 
no seller may "[m]isrepresent the nature, quantity, material 
characteristics, performance or efficacy of the goods or services offered 
or promoted by a seller."286 Unquestionably, the direct marketing 
regulations apply to the sale of a product, and upon the occurrence of an 
economic loss, the economic loss doctrine will apply. More particularly, 
if the sale is fraudulently induced, the narrow exception provides that 
for interwoven terms, the aggrieved party's remedy is solely breach of 
contract. The regulations provide that a violation occurs if a seller 
"[m]isrepresent[s] the nature, quantity, material characteristics, 
performance or efficacy of the goods." 287 Clearly, the regulations 
prohibit a seller from fraudulently inducing a contract by 
misrepresenting any terms, including interwoven terms. 
The authorizing statute also provides that any violation of the 
DATCP's regulations permits the aggrieved party to sue for damages 
and recover twice the amount of the pecuniary loss, together with costs 
and attorney's fee. 288 There are a number of purposes served by the 
statutory remedies. "First, the recovery of double damages and attorney 
275. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 114.02 (2004). 
276. Id. § 117.10. 
277. Id. § 122.01. 
278. Id. § 123.10. 
279. Id. § 125.09. 
280. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 127.14, 127.44, 127.72 (2006). 
281. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 131.07 (2006). 
282. WIS. ADMIN. CODE A TCP § 132.09 (2004 ). 
283. WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 110.01(1), 111.01, 123.01(13) , 125.01(1), 127.01(2) 
(2006). 
284. Id. chs. 114,117,122,131,132. 
285. Id. §§ 127.14(5), 127.44(5), 127.72(5). 
286. Id. § 127.14(5). 
287. Id. 
288. WIS. STAT.§ 100.20(5) (2005-2006). 
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fees encourages [aggrieved parties] to bring legal actions to enforce their 
rights under the admini trative regulations."289 Second, the aggrieved 
parties who sue act as "private attorney[ s] general" who not only 
enforce their indiv.idual rights but the aggregate of the individual suits 
enforces the public's right .290 Third, the aggrieved-party suits that 
subject violators to double damages have the effect of deterring 
unacceptable c nduct. And finally, the private attorney general suits 
'provide a necessary backup to the state's enforcement powers." 291 
A recent case illustrates the correct relationship between the 
DATCP regulations and the economic loss doctrine's directive to limit 
an aggrieved party to his or her contract remedies. In Stuart v. 
Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 292 homeowners were fraudulently 
induced to enter into an architectural and remodeling contract in 
violation of DATCP section 110. The homeowners sued and sought 
damages under section 100.20(5). The court concluded that the 
economic loss doctrine was not applicable because the contracts were 
primarily for services. 293 Nevertheless, the court analyzed the 
relationship between the economic loss doctrine and the DATCP code 
violations. The court noted that the claims arising from the 
administrative code violations are tort-based, not contract-based. 
Further, the court reasoned that the statutory cause of action for 
fraudulent inducement is "separate and apart from any breach of 
contract" action. 294 The court noted that there is no indication that the 
legislature, by passing the authorizing legislation, 'intended lo imply 
add a remedy to common law misrepresentation claims or breach of 
contract claims."295 The court concluded by stating that to apply the 
economic loss doctrine to a proven DATCP violation would defeat the 
289. Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis. 2d 352, 358, 340 N.W.2d 506, 509 (1983). 
290. !d. at 358, 340 N.W.2d at 509. 
291. !d. 
292. 2006 WI App 109, '![ 17, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 17, 721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[ 17; see also 
Carlson v. Gleichsner, No. 04-1376, 2005 WL 241168, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2005) 
(noting that the economic Joss doctrine would not be a bar to a violation of Wisconsin 
Administrative Code of Transportation section 139.03(1)). Section 139.03 prohibits the use of 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation to induce the purchase of a motor vehicle. WIS. 
ADMIN. CODE TRANS.§ 139.03(1) (2004). 
293. Stuart, 2006 WI App 109, ~I 28,293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 28, 721 N.W.2d 127, ~128; see also 
Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2006 WI App 184, 296 Wis. 2d 249, 722 N.W.2d 
766. 
294. Stuart, 2006 WI App 109, 'l[ 26, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 26, 721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[ 26. 
295. !d. 'l[ 33,293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[ 33,721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[ 33. 
968 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [90:921 
public purpose underlying section 100.20.296 "[R]emedial statutes should 
be liberally construed to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy 
that the statute intended to afford." 297 
In addition to authorizing a statutory cause of action for falsely 
inducing contracts in violation of DATCP regulations, the statute also 
authorizes double damages and the recovery of attorney's fees. 298 
Courts have also permitted a plaintiff to elect punitive damages in lieu 
of the statutorily authorized double damages. 299 Thus, an aggrieved 
party who has been falsely induced to enter into a contract in violation 
of the DATCP regulations has a statutory right to sue to recover his 
pecuniary loss, plus attorney's fees, and if the circumstances merit, 
punitive damages. These rights are in direct derogation to the economic 
loss doctrine, which restricts an aggrieved party to only the contract 
remedy. Further, the narrow exception would only permit a tort cause 
of action if the false material related to an extraneous contact matter. 
No such restriction is imposed under the statutory cause of action for a 
violation of DATCP regulations. Thus, the statutory cause of action 
pursuant to the authorizing statute and DATCP regulations supersedes 
the economic loss doctrine and the narrow exception. 
D. Statutory and Regulatory Summary 
The narrow exception is in direct conflict with a number of 
Wisconsin statutes and regulations that were enacted to redress 
fraudulently induced contracts. An aggrieved party has a statutorily 
authorized civil cause of action against a tortfeasor who has criminally 
and fraudulently induced him or her to transfer his or her property to 
another. The statute authorizes the aggrieved party to recover any 
economic losses, costs, and punitive damages. 300 The legislature's 
approach is a tort approach to redress fraudulently induced contracts, 
not a contract approach. The focus is on the tortfeasor's conduct, not 
the buyer's contract negotiating acumen. No duty is placed on the buyer 
to assume, allocate, or ensure against the fraud in the contract. The 
narrow exception, which bars a tort action for interwoven fraud, directly 
conflicts with the statutorily authorized civil cause of action. 
296. !d. 'l[34, 293 Wis. 2d 668, 'l[34, 721 N.W.2d 127, 'l[34. 
297. Benkoski v. Flood, 2001 WI App 84, 'll 8, 242 Wis .. 2d 652, 'll 8, 626 N.W.2d 851, 'l[8. 
298. WIS. STAT.§ 100.20(5) (2005-2006). 
299. See, e.g., Seay v. Gardner, No. 94-1933-Ff, 1995 WL 556273, at *2-*3 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Sept. 21, 1995); Zablocki v. Hoefs, 128 Wis. 2d 560, 384 N.W.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(unpublished). 
300. See WIS. STAT.§ 895.446(3) (2005-2006). 
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The Wisconsin DTP A regulate: ma1·keting and trade practices. One 
particularly broad provi ion f the DTPA pr hibits fraudulently 
inducing a contract for the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any real 
estate merchandise securities, employment service, or anything else:1''' ' 
Any violation of the DTPA create a cause of action Lhat permits a 
buyer to recover any conomic loss co ts, attorney's fees and punitive 
damages.:m2 The DTPA approach to fraudulently induced contracts is a 
tort approach, not a contract approach. No duty is placed on the buyer 
to assume, all. cate, or insure against fraud. The DTPA's focus is on the 
tortfeasor' misconduct, not the buyer's n g tiating ability. The narrow 
exception, which bars any tort acti n for interwoven fraud clearly 
conflicts with the DTPA. As such , tbe narrow exception is likely 
rendered moot as a matter of implicit preemption by the DTPA' broad 
coverage and statutorily authorized cause of action. 
Finally the Wisconsin DATCP has promulgated regulation that 
forbid various unfair trade practices including fraudulently inducing a 
consumer to enter into a contract fOT goods and servic . An aggrieved 
consumer is authorized by statute to sue for any violation of DATCP 
regulations. 111~ The aggrieved consumer is statutorily authorized to 
recover twice hi p cunia:ry loss, c sts, and attorneys fee . Punitive 
damages can also be elected in lieu of the d uble damages. 304 The 
tatutory approach for fraud ulently inducing a consumer contract in 
violation of DATCP regulations i a t rt approach, not a contract 
approach. No dut)' is placed on the buyer to as ume, aU cate or insure 
against fraud . The DATCP regulations' focus is on the t rtfeasor's 
misconduct which · the source of the problem. Again, tl1e narrow 
exception which bar any tort action for interwoven fraud clearly 
conflicts with the authorized tort r medy for fTaudulently inducing 
contracts in violation of DATCP regulations. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The narrow fraud in the inducement exception o the economic Joss 
doctrine is not a ound principle. It conflicts with establi heel precedent 
under contract and tort law and conflicts with Wisconsin statutes and 
regulations. For example, established c ntract principles dealing with 
fraud under the parol evidence rule and as is clause have always 
301. See id. § 100.18(1). 
302. See id. § 100.20(5). 
303. See id. 
304. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
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permitted a tort action for any type of fraud. Further, contract clauses 
that exculpate one for his or her intentional torts are against public 
policy and not enforceable. Similarly, the narrow exception's tort bar 
for interwoven fraud is against public policy. Tort principles are also 
adversely affected by the adoption of the narrow exception. The torts of 
promissory fraud and fraud in the factum/execution are eliminated by 
barring tort actions for interwoven fraud. Unlike other torts committed 
in the context of a contractual setting that are deemed independent torts 
separate and apart from the contract, interwoven fraud is not considered 
an independent tort. Under tort law, duress and fraud are considered to 
be the same specie of tort. They both wrongfully induce the formation 
of a contract. The narrow exception, however, treats them differently 
by creating a tort exception for interwoven fraud. The narrow exception 
also requires different treatment for virtually identical torts. A bailee 
who exceeds the authorized use for bailed property commits a breach of 
contract and the tort of conversion. The tort is actionable. One who 
commits fraud in the inducement commits a breach of contract and the 
tort of intentional misrepresentation. The tort is not actionable for 
interwoven fraud. Punitive damages cannot be assessed when 
interwoven fraud is involved because the sole remedy is contract law. 
The tortfeasor's deceitful conduct goes unpunished, and no message or 
the wrong message is sent to others who may be watching. Also, the 
public duty to be honest in contractual dealings is not promoted by the 
narrow exception, since only contract remedies are available for 
interwoven fraud. Finally, the narrow exception conflicts with the 
various statutory causes of action authorized by Wisconsin Statutes, 
including the Wisconsin DTPA, and it conflicts with DATCP 
regulations. The statutory and regulatory approach to redressing 
fraudulently induced contracts is a tort approach. Both focus on the 
tortfeasor, not the victim. The burden is placed on the tortfeasor and 
others similarly situated not to commit fraudulent conduct. For many 
reasons, the narrow fraud in the inducement exception is simply not the 
correct exception needed for fraud. 
The broad exception is clearly the better exception. It correctly 
redresses all deceitful conduct and treats it as tortious behavior. The 
broad exception avoids all the conflicts with tort and contract law. 
Finally, the broad exception follows the tort approach as adopted by the 
Wisconsin statutes and regulations in redressing fraudulently induced 
contracts. 
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